

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

October 21, 2025

1.19

TO: The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Chief of Police

SUBJECT: 2025 PALISADES FIRE AFTER-ACTION REPORT

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

- I. That the Board of Police Commissioners REVIEW and APPROVE the attached 2025 Palisades Fire After-Action Report.

DISCUSSION:

Attached is the 2025 Palisades Fire After-Action Report, which reviews the Los Angeles Police Department's operational response during the Palisades Fire that began on January 7, 2025. The magnitude of the incident prompted the activation of the Department's Citywide Incident Management Teams and a Citywide Tactical Alert to support firefighting operations, conduct evacuations, and maintain perimeter security. The report was prepared by the Major Events Group in coordination with the Department's Citywide Incident Management Teams and Operations-West Bureau.

Should you have any questions regarding this request, please have a member of your staff contact Commander Hamed Mohammadi, Commanding Officer of Major Events Group at (213) 486-0299.



JIM McDONNELL
Chief of Police

Attachments

2025 Palisades Fire

AFTER-ACTION REPORT



LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

Prepared by Major Events Group

April 15, 2025



Table of Contents

Executive Summary	5
Background	8
Chronological Narration	9
Part One: Initial Response (January 6 through January 8)	9
Monday - January 6: Pre-Planning	9
Tuesday, January 7: Start of the Fire	10
Part Two: Containment (January 8 th through January 18 th)	19
Zuma Beach Unified Command	19
Creation of Structured Deployment	20
Media Access	21
Curfew Order	22
Arrival of the California National Guard	22
Mutual Aid	23
Operations Chief Returns to LAPD CP	23
Support from the Off-Road Unit	23
West Valley and Brentwood Evacuations	23
Introduction of Genasys Zones	24
Management of the Expanded Incident	25
Vehicle Impounds	26
Part Three: Repopulation (January 19 th through February 4 th)	27
West Valley Repopulation	27
Activation of IMT-4	27
Repopulation of the Highlands (767-J)	27
Assignment of Non-Coded Radio Calls	28
Repopulation Orders Expand	29
Presidential Visit	29
Dissolution of the Unified Command	29
Tactical Alert Rescinded	30
Deaths and Injuries	31
Crimes and Arrests	32



Property Damage	34
Personnel.....	35
Analysis.....	35
Logistics.....	37
Communications: Network -Radio and Cellular.....	37
Location of Command Post	37
Staging Area and Base Camp	37
Staging Area for Allied Agencies	38
Ground Support.....	38
Support of Personnel.....	38
Notable Dates.....	39
January 7	39
January 8	39
January 9	39
January 10	39
January 12	39
January 15	39
January 16	39
January 24	39
Critique	40
1. Communications Infrastructure and Technology.....	40
2. Initial Coordination with LAFD	41
3. Documentation	41
4. Chain of Command.....	43
5. Zone Mapping.....	44
6. National Guard Deployment	44
7. Effectiveness of the Citywide IMTs	44
8. Logistical Support.....	45
9. Utilization of other City Agencies	46
10. Command Post Location	46
Chronological Log	48



2025 Palisades Fire

After-Action Report

Tuesday, January 7, 2025.....	48
Wednesday, January 8, 2025	57
Thursday, January 9, 2025	59
Friday, January 10, 2025.....	63
Saturday, January 11, 2025	65
Sunday, January 12, 2025	67
Monday, January 13, 2025.....	67
Tuesday, January 14, 2025.....	68
Wednesday, January 15, 2025	69
Thursday, January 16, 2025	69
Friday, January 17, 2025.....	71
Saturday, January 18, 2025	72
Sunday, January 19, 2025	73
Monday, January 20, 2025.....	74
Tuesday, January 21, 2025.....	74
Wednesday, January 22, 2025	76
Thursday, January 23, 2025	77
Friday, January 24, 2025.....	78
Saturday, January 25, 2025.....	78
Sunday, January 26, 2025	79
Monday, January 27, 2025.....	80
Tuesday, January 28, 2025.....	80
Wednesday, January 29, 2025	80
Thursday, January 30, 2025	81
Friday, January 31, 2025.....	82
Saturday, February 1, 2025.....	82
Sunday, February 2, 2025	82
Monday, February 3, 2025.....	83
Tuesday, February 4, 2025.....	83
Appendix.....	84
Appendix A: List of LAPD Incident Commanders	84



Appendix B: Acronyms 87

Appendix C: Los Angeles County Curfew Order..... 89

This space was intentionally left blank



Executive Summary

On January 7, 2025, the Palisades Fire ignited in the foothills of the Santa Monica Mountains in the Los Angeles Police Department's West Los Angeles Area. Fueled by sustained high winds, the wildfire quickly spread through the Pacific Palisades, into the City of Malibu and other unincorporated parts of Los Angeles County.

The size of the fire and the danger it presented to the communities in the Palisades and Malibu necessitated a large and coordinated emergency response. As the State's foremost expert on wildfires, the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire) responded and entered into a Unified Command with the Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACoFD), the Los Angeles City Fire Department (LAFD), the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD), and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD or 'the Department').

Despite the heroic efforts of first responders, the fire burned for 24 days, engulfed 23,448 acres, took the lives of 12 people (five in the City of Los Angeles), forced the evacuation of over 60,000 people, and destroyed over 6,000 structures. In terms of cost, preliminary estimates indicate that the fire is likely to be the most expensive fire-related disaster in United States history.

As a supporting agency in the multi-jurisdictional Unified Command, the LAPD assisted firefighting efforts by providing perimeter control, traffic control, crime suppression, and investigative support. To staff these critical functions, the LAPD was put on Tactical Alert for 29 days to give the Department the ability to draw an increased number of officers from their regular assignments. Between January 11 and January 16, when the LAPD's operation was at its peak, over 700 officers a day were assigned to the Palisades Fire.

The LAPD has extensive experience handling large scale tactical and crowd control incidents but is only occasionally involved in disaster response situations. Though the Palisades recovery effort remains ongoing, this report was prepared to analyze the LAPD's response during the 29-day Tactical Alert to identify successes and areas for improvement. While this examination identified several areas in which the Department can improve, the heroic and courageous efforts of LAPD officers, supervisors, and command staff cannot be overstated. The Palisades Fire was a once in a lifetime cataclysmic event. The combination of extreme wind, dry conditions, unique topography, and the intricate design of roadways made it extremely difficult for first responders to save lives and protect property. Despite those challenges, this report found that the LAPD took swift and decisive action to protect Palisades' residents.

However, while this report found that Operations-West Bureau personnel responded bravely, and the Citywide Incident Management Teams who took over managing the incident were effective; the Palisades Fire response provided an opportunity for the Department to conduct a critical assessment of its ability to successfully manage a natural disaster incident. For that purpose, through a critical lens, this report identified several areas for improvement regarding



communications infrastructure; basic application of ICS principles; coordination with the other City agencies; mapping technology; and, logistical support. These topics are discussed at length in the Critique section of the report, and it is crucial that the LAPD demonstrate its commitment to Quality through Continuous Improvement and take steps to address these areas for improvement before the next major incident impacts the City of Los Angeles.

This space was intentionally left blank



DISCLAIMER

This report does not attempt to analyze or address fire mitigation efforts in any way. This report is specific to the Los Angeles Police Department and will only explore topics related to the Los Angeles Police Department's actions, involvement, and responsibilities. The origin of the Palisades Fire, how it spread, and what actions were taken to contain and prevent its expansion are topics that are outside the scope of this report.

Any description or reference to where the fire started, how the fire moved, changes in the fire's direction, and weather conditions are based on personal observations provided by LAPD personnel. These observations are not presented as facts and are only given to provide context to better describe challenges and explain why certain decisions were made.

This space was intentionally left blank



Background

The Pacific Palisades are a collection of secluded coastal communities located 20 miles west of downtown Los Angeles, in the foothills of the Santa Monica Mountains. The Palisades are bordered by the City of Santa Monica to the south, Malibu to the north, and the Los Angeles community of Brentwood to the east. Geographical topography in the Palisades is diverse as neighborhoods rise from the beach and into the hills of the mountains. The Palisades area is generally affluent and population density is comparatively low.

The region is primarily accessible by vehicle from Pacific Coast Highway (PCH), which runs north and south, or Sunset Boulevard (Sunset), which runs east and west. Outside of these major access points, residential neighborhoods are accessible from small streets that change direction as they wind through the hills. There are eight prominent neighborhoods within the Palisades: the Palisades Highlands; the Alphabet Streets; El Medio Bluffs; Marquez Knolls; the Via Bluffs; Castellammare; the Ridgeview Country Estates; and, the Huntington Palisades.





Chronological Narration

This section of the report provides a chronological narration of the Los Angeles Police Department's response and actions during the Palisades Fire. The narrative is broken into three parts: Initial Response, Containment, and Repopulation. The part of the narrative dealing with the initial response is more in depth and descriptive. As the narrative moves into the Containment and Repopulation phase, the report focuses primarily on major changes to the Department's operational focus and relies heavily on footnotes to provide context and additional information.¹ For specific information on each day's operations, a detailed chronological log of each day is included at the end of the report.

Part One: Initial Response (January 6 through January 8)

Monday - January 6: Pre-Planning

On Monday, January 6, 2025, the National Weather Service (NWS) issued a Red Flag Warning for strong winds across southern California beginning Tuesday, January 7, 2025, through Wednesday, January 8, 2025, and possibly into Friday, January 10, 2025. The NWS predicted the storm could produce destructive wind gusts of 80 to 100 miles per hour at its peak. Tuesday at 12:00 p.m., through Wednesday at 12:00 p.m., was classified as a "Particularly Dangerous Situation" (PDS). Within the warning, the NWS indicated that the Santa Monica Mountains and Foothills were locations of great concern.




¹ Information presented in the Chronological Narration was compiled from CAD incident logs, recordings of radio frequencies, CP chronological logs, Incident Actions Plans, daily Senior Staff updates, IMT debriefs, an after-action survey, and group interviews with key personnel.



At 2:00 p.m., the City of Los Angeles Emergency Management Department (EMD) held an Adverse Weather Coordination Call with all City family agencies. During the call, the LAPD indicated that Hollywood and West Los Angeles (West LA) Areas would work with LAFD counterparts in accordance with standard operating procedures. The LAPD also noted that many resources were assigned to a visit from the President of the United States (POTUS). Due to the potential storm, and the dignitary visit, the LAPD stated that their DOC would replicate the EOC's level of activation.

Tuesday, January 7: Start of the Fire

At 10:23 a.m., a radio call was generated for a brushfire near 1224 Piedra Morada Drive in the Pacific Palisades Highlands (the Highlands). Minutes later, another call was generated at 16597 Calle Victoria, which is also in the Highlands.² Nearby, a West LA XL-unit (a single officer patrol unit) noticed several fire engines driving up the hill towards the Highlands with their lights and sirens (code-three). The XL-unit confirmed with Communications Division that a fire had been reported in the area and responded to the location immediately.



² Computer-aided Dispatch (CAD) Incident No. 25010700001693 & CAD Incident No. 25010700001731



At scene, the West LA officer observed a large plume of smoke rising from the canyons below. Firefighters who were already at the location advised the officer that they were attempting to evacuate the area, leading the officer to request three additional units to respond code-three to assist with evacuations.³ As the officer waited for additional units to respond, he began re-directing residents attempting to enter the area to save their family members, pets, and valued possessions.

At 10:53 a.m., as officers were responding to the XL-unit's request, LAFD requested Communications Division to advise responding LAPD units that a Command Post (CP) had been established at Fire Station 23, located at 17281 Sunset Boulevard, down the hill from the Palisades Highlands. Several units from West LA began heading towards the CP, but the long drive to the far westside of the division prevented the units from arriving quickly.⁴

The Ridgeview Neighborhood

At 11:05 a.m., a West LA field supervisor (8L80) was driving westbound on Sunset Boulevard to assist the XL-unit in the Highlands when he observed smoke rising from the hills behind the Ridgeview Country Estates (the Ridgeview neighborhood). The supervisor interrupted his response to the XL-unit's location and drove into the neighborhood to investigate. At the top of the Ridgeview neighborhood, near Floresta and Floresta Place, the supervisor found that the fire was quickly heading down the hillside towards homes in the area. Firefighters were already in the area, so the supervisor requested three additional patrol units and immediately began running door-to-door to advise residents to evacuate.

Sustained high winds caused the fire to continue spreading at an exponential rate. Within minutes of the supervisor's arrival, the entire hillside north of Ridgeview was engulfed by flames. By the time the three units arrived, the fire was already spreading into yards and igniting landscaping on Floresta Place. The officers were not equipped with necessary personal protective equipment (PPE), and the intense smoke quickly forced them to abandon the door-to-door evacuations.⁵

At 11:15 a.m., 45 minutes after the first radio calls were generated, the West LA sergeant at the top of Ridgeview decided that the size of the fire and its proximity to nearby homes presented a massive threat to public safety, leading him to declare a Citywide Tactical Alert and request 12 additional units. However, due to the wind and the poor radio reception on the hillside, it took

³ On December 10, 2024, prior to the Palisades Fire, the West LA Area Training Unit created a PowerPoint presentation to educate their entire command on the Department's policies and procedures for responding to brushfires. The presentation focused on four areas of responsibility: (1) Perimeter Control, (2) Evacuations, (3) Security of Evacuated Areas, and (4) Safety of Field Personnel.


⁴ West LA patrol units reported that it takes upwards of twenty minutes to drive from West LA station to the Palisades under normal traffic conditions. On the day the Palisades Fire started, the increase in traffic caused some units to not arrive for nearly 40 minutes.

⁵ Insufficient PPE for police officers was a continuous problem during the first few days of the incident. *See Critique: 8. Logistical Support*



several minutes for Communications Division to confirm the Tactical Alert declaration. It was not until the West LA Patrol Commanding Officer, who was enroute to the incident, re-affirmed the field supervisor's transmission that the Tactical Alert was broadcasted to the rest of the Department.

The declaration of a Tactical Alert significantly increased radio traffic on West LA's base frequency, leading the West LA Watch Commander to request a dedicated Tactical Frequency for resources assigned to the incident. While it is not uncommon for significant tactical incidents to have their own dedicated channel, the move to a separate tactical frequency was the source of significant confusion as the incident developed.



Fire Station 23 Command Post

As LAPD resources from across the City were dispatched to the Palisades, LAFD directed that all units should respond to their CP at Fire Station 23 before deploying to the field. At 11:30 a.m., the West LA Patrol Commanding Officer (Commander 8B) responded to the CP and assumed the role of Incident Commander (IC) for the LAPD. Approximately 15 minutes later, the West LA




Area Commanding Officer (Commander 8A) arrived and took over as the IC and Commander 8B was assigned as the Operations Section Chief (OSC).⁶ Together, the two LAPD captains worked to strategically assign incoming resources to evacuations and traffic control.

According to several LAPD personnel who were at the CP, coordination between LAFD and LAPD was minimal at Fire Station 23. The LAPD's policy clearly states that the LAFD IC has overall command responsibility of brushfire incidents and the Department's mission is to support the LAFD IC.⁷ Unfortunately, the rate of the fire's growth forced LAFD to focus all of its attention on mitigating the spread of the fire, which prevented them from strategically directing evacuations. In the absence of direction from LAFD, the LAPD began deploying resources based on information received from officers in the field and 911 calls for assistance.⁸

Traffic Gridlock

As residents fled the Highlands and Ridgeview, traffic on Sunset Boulevard came to a standstill. At 11:30 a.m., the supervisor managing the evacuations in Ridgeview reported that the line of cars on Bienvenida, north of Sunset Boulevard, was almost a mile long. Not only did the gridlock on Sunset Boulevard delay the evacuations, but the heavy traffic also made it nearly impossible for first responders to reach their destinations.



⁶ This information is provided according to statements given during informal interviews conducted in the preparation of this report. Neither commanding officer immediately notified Communications Division when they took over as the IC and the transfer of command was never officially documented.

⁷ Los Angeles Police Department Bushfire Response Guide, dated August 28, 2024

⁸ See Critique: 2. Initial Coordination with LAFD



The need to alleviate traffic congestion on Sunset Boulevard quickly became a top priority for the LAPD and officers were deployed to the following intersections:

- Sunset Boulevard and Pacific Coast Highway;
- Sunset Boulevard and Castellammare Drive;
- Sunset Boulevard and Palisades Drive; and,
- Sunset Boulevard and Bienveneda Avenue.

Re-Assignment of POTUS Resources

On January 7, the LAPD had a large contingent of officers, including all of the Department's on-duty motorcycle officers, assigned to the POTUS visit at a nearby location in West LA Area. At 11:30 a.m., the LAPD IC contacted the POTUS CP to request the assistance of motorcycle officers whose ability to maneuver through heavy traffic would have helped reduce the gridlock in the Palisades. Unfortunately, the POTUS CP was unable to release the motorcycle officers. However, due to a change in the President's schedule, the POTUS CP was able to send 65 officers in patrol cars to the Palisades incident.

The availability of these officers provided the Palisades CP with a vital injection of resources in a relatively short amount of time. Were these resources not already on standby at a nearby location, the evacuation efforts would have been greatly diminished.

Command Post Relocated to Will Rogers

By 11:55 a.m., the fire was moving quickly towards Fire Station 23 and the CP was forced to relocate to a parking lot on the north side of Will Rogers State Beach, near the intersection of Pacific Coast Highway and Sunset Boulevard. While this move later caused some confusion for units who had been dispatched by Communications Division, Fire Station 23 was on fire by 1:30 p.m.

Expansion of the OWB Incident Management Team

As the fire continued to sweep through neighborhoods and force additional evacuations, it quickly became clear that the level of the Department's involvement in the incident would require a fully staffed Incident Management Team (IMT). At approximately 1:15 p.m., the Assistant Commanding Officer from Operations-West Bureau responded and took over as the Incident Commander; Commander 8A was assigned as the Operations Chief; Commander 8B was assigned as the Deputy Operations Section Chief; the West LA Area Detective Commanding Officer assumed the role of Planning Chief; and the Assistant Officer-in-Charge of Emergency Operations Division's Emergency Management Section was assigned as the Logistics Chief.⁹

⁹ These assignments were documented on an ICS 201 prepared by ESD at 11:15 p.m. At the time when the ICS 201 was prepared, Commander 8A had been replaced as Operations Section Chief by Commander 8B.



Note: For the remainder of this report, the Operations-West Bureau Incident Management Teams that managed the Department's response on A-Watch and B-Watch on January 7 will be referred to as the "OWB IMT." The Citywide Incident Management Teams that were assigned to the incident as it grew into multiple operational periods will be referred to by their numerical designations.

Due to the smoke and traffic congestion around the CP at Will Rogers State Beach, the newly formed OWB IMT began directing incoming resources to the Federal Building, where a team from Operations-West Bureau handled check-in. After being checked-in, resources were then sent to the CP at Will Rogers State Beach where they were given assignments and missions.

Trapped Motorists

The officers assigned to traffic control at major intersections on Sunset Boulevard were overwhelmed by the number of evacuees and the absence of dedicated egress routes prevented them from achieving a consistent flow of traffic. At 1:05 p.m., the West LA sergeant assigned to manage traffic at Palisades Drive and Sunset reported that the fire had overtaken both sides of Palisades Drive and motorists who were still in their vehicles were in imminent danger. As a last resort, officers at the intersection directed evacuees to abandon their vehicles and flee the area on foot towards Pacific Coast Highway. While this decision was necessitated by the immediate danger, the staggering number of abandoned cars only made it more difficult for fire engines to navigate the area and later forced firefighters to use a bulldozer to clear vehicles from the roadway. However, the decision was ultimately justified when, at 1:15 p.m., a patrol unit at Sunset and Palisades Drive reported that several vehicles left at the location were catching fire.



Radio Calls for Evacuations

Around 1:15 p.m., Communications Division created a master incident for evacuation calls for people requesting assistance for themselves, or assistance for friends and family members. As the day progressed, Communications Division received over 160 calls for assistance.¹⁰ Many of the people who were reported to be stuck in their homes were elderly or disabled. However, as officers were dispatched to locations throughout the Palisades, it soon became evident that many of the calls were generated for individuals who had been successfully evacuated. Cell phone networks in the area were either down, or overburdened, and people were calling 911 when they could not verify that their loved ones had made it to safety.

¹⁰ This number does not include Code-6 incidents or incidents that were designated as "Information Only."



Communications Challenges

At 4:20 p.m., Communications Division advised the CP that the Department of Water and Power (DWP) had shut down the Green Mountain radio repeater site due to the wind and fire. Under normal circumstances, communications in the Palisades are difficult due to the distance from the City's main towers and the effect the Santa Monica Mountains have on radio transmissions. The poor communication was made exponentially worse when the fires destroyed the radio and cell phone sites designed specifically to serve the area. The inability to directly communicate with responding units made it difficult for the CP to quickly dispatch units for traffic control and evacuations. At times, the CP was forced to communicate with officers in the field through the West LA Watch Commander who had access to personal cell phone numbers.


Final Command Post Relocation

At approximately 4:50 p.m., as the fire continued to advance toward the beach, the CP at Pacific Coast Highway and Sunset Boulevard became engulfed in smoke and the CP was forced to move a third time—this time to the southern tip of the Will Rogers State Beach parking lot.¹¹

Hot Zone Designation

At approximately 6:00 p.m., the LAPD IC informed Communications Division that a 'hotzone' had been established along Pacific Coast Highway between Entrada Road and Topanga Canyon, and LAPD would not be responding into the area.¹²

Once the hotzone was established, the CP stopped assigning officers to calls for service at addresses in the designated danger area. Any calls inside the designated hotzone were transferred to LAFD. However, the creation of the hotzone did not prevent LAPD officers from self-deploying into the area to facilitate evacuations in life threatening situations.



Evacuation of Additional Neighborhoods

Around 6:10 p.m., the fire began spreading towards the Village, the Via Bluffs, the Huntington Palisades, and the Alphabet Streets. A West LA supervisor in the area observed that several of these neighborhoods were filled with residents that had yet to evacuate and immediately requested

¹¹ The repeated relocation of the command post and operational staging area became a major point of discussion. *See Critique: 10. Command Post Location*


¹² According to the Los Angeles Police Department's Brushfire Response Guide, dated August 28, 2014, "In general, law enforcement resources should not be committed to rescue operations between the head of the fire and the point to which the fire will travel in 30 minutes. This zone is typically where only the Fire Department works."



10 units to respond to Sunset Boulevard and Swarthmore Avenue. From Sunset Boulevard and Swarthmore Avenue, the units were divided into squads and assigned to begin proactively evacuating all of the neighborhoods south of Temescal Canyon.

The size of the neighborhoods, the intense smoke, and low visibility made door-to-door evacuations dangerous and ineffective. Instead, officers drove through the neighborhoods using their PA systems to advise residents to leave the area immediately. As the fire continued to spread east along the Sunset corridor, evacuees from the Village, the Via Bluffs, and the Huntington Palisades were directed down Chautauqua Boulevard to southbound Pacific Coast Highway.

The West LA supervisor's decision to call for evacuations in the Alphabet Streets, Via Bluffs, and Huntington Palisades likely saved countless lives. By 7:15 p.m., homes in these neighborhoods began to catch fire. Ultimately, the Via Bluffs and the Alphabet Streets were almost entirely destroyed.



Following the neighborhood evacuations along Sunset Boulevard, LAPD's operations and deployment for the remainder of the day focused on traffic control and response to radio calls for evacuation assistance. To relieve day watch units who had been working since the early morning, the DOC pulled Watch-5 and Watch-3 patrol resources from across the city to staff B-Watch



positions in the Palisades. Responding B-Watch officers were directed to the Federal Building where staff assigned to Operations-West Bureau's Special Events checked them in and directed them to the CP at Will Rogers State Beach for deployment into the operation.

Transfer of Command

At midnight, the LAPD's operations were static enough to allow a new contingent of OWB personnel to take control of the incident. To alleviate the fatigue of OWB IMT members who had been working since early that morning, the Area Commanding Officer from Olympic Area was briefed on the status of the incident, and command of Department resources was officially transferred to B-Watch. Though strong winds continued to fuel the fire, LAPD's operational focus remained steady during the early morning hours. Officers assigned to B-Watch were either assigned to traffic control points or as response units for radio calls that were broadcasted in the area. Overnight, the B-Watch OWB IC routinely met with LAFD to offer support, but LAFD remained focused on managing the fire and only asked for LAPD assistance with 911 calls.





Part Two: Containment (January 8th through January 18th)

By evening on the first day of the fire, the level of devastation made it clear that the Palisades Fire would require a prolonged LAPD response. To ensure that the Palisades Fire would be adequately and efficiently managed, the Chief of Police activated the Department's Citywide Incident Management Teams to assume on-scene command of the incident.

Citywide Incident Management Teams

In February of 2023, the LAPD assembled four Citywide Incident Management Teams to plan and manage large-scale and/or high-profile incidents occurring in the City of Los Angeles. The four IMTs (IMT-1, IMT-2, IMT-3, IMT-4) were staffed with personnel who were assigned to specific roles under the five Incident Command System (ICS) functions: Incident Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance & Administration.

On January 8, at 6:00 a.m., Citywide IMT-2 (IMT-2) was briefed on the status of the incident and officially assumed command of LAPD operations at the Palisades Fire. Under the guidance of LAPD's Major Events Group, Citywide IMT-1 (IMT-1) and IMT-2 were scheduled to rotate command every three days through the conclusion of the incident, with each IMT running internal A/B-Watches during their deployments.

Zuma Beach Unified Command

Management of the incident shifted dramatically on the morning of January 8 when Cal Fire took over management of the incident and set up the Unified Command Post (UCP) at Zuma Beach, in the City of Malibu. To ensure the LAPD had appropriate representation in the Cal Fire Unified Command, IMT-2's IC and OSC responded directly to Zuma Beach to coordinate with the other emergency response agencies. Unfortunately, during the first days of the incident, communications between Zuma Beach and Will Rogers were extremely poor.¹³

Note: For the remainder of this report, the Cal Fire Unified Command Post at Zuma Beach will be referred to as the "UCP." The LAPD staging area at Will Rogers State Beach will be referred to as the "LAPD CP."

With the OSC unable to communicate directly with units in the field, orders and directions for the deployment of resources were routed through IMT-2's Planning Section Chief (PSC) who was stationed at LAPD CP. This added responsibility was challenging for the PSC, who was also responsible for managing and tracking the large number of officers responding to the incident.

¹³ The LAPD Land Mobile Radio (LMR) system was not designed to operate in the City of Malibu and the First Net cell phone network could not provide consistent connectivity. *See Critique: I. Communications Infrastructure and Technology*



Additionally, the separation of the IC and OSC at the UCP forced both the UCP and the LAPD CP to keep their own individual Resource Status (ReStat) and Situational Status (SitStat) boards, leading to double work and miscommunication.¹⁴

Creation of Structured Deployment

On the first day of their deployment, IMT-2 worked quickly to bring structure and organization to the LAPD's deployment at the Palisades.¹⁵ To meet the objectives set forth by the UCP, IMT-2 built a scalable operational plan that focused deployment on the following operational functions:¹⁶

Traffic Control Points

To secure the perimeter around the evacuation area, officers were assigned to traffic control points (TCPs) at critical ingress and egress locations around the evacuation zone. To ensure that the TCPs were strategically placed to secure the perimeter, IMT-2 requested a traffic liaison from West Traffic Division who was familiar with the area. The addition of the traffic liaison was a critical component to operations. Throughout the incident, the number of TCPs and their locations changed as the evacuation zone was modified and evacuation orders were amended.

Crime Suppression

The mandatory evacuation of the Palisades left thousands of homes unattended, creating a target-rich environment for criminal activity. To prevent looting and other criminal acts, crime suppression squads were assigned to specific RDs (reporting districts), ensuring high visibility and the ability to respond quickly to crimes in progress.¹⁷

Evacuations

After the initial evacuations on January 7, the LAPD continued to deploy resources to assist with evacuations. Later, escort squads were used to evacuate portions of West Valley and Brentwood as the fire spread outwards from the Palisades.

¹⁴ During the first few days of the incident, the Zuma Beach CP did not have internet connectivity. This forced the LAPD CP to hand deliver copies of 211s and other critical documents to the Zuma CP, which was 20 miles away.

¹⁵ The OWB IMTs who initially responded to the fires and managed the incident overnight did not complete the standard ICS documentation required for an incident with multiple operational periods. Aside from a basic ICS 201, there was no documentation indicating objectives, where resources were deployed, and what actions had been taken before IMT-2 took control of the incident. *See Critique: 3. Documentation*

¹⁶ As the needs of the incident evolved, these functions were re-named and sometimes organized under different branches as different IMTs assumed command of the incident.

¹⁷ Throughout the incident, the LAPD CP worked closely with Communications Division to ensure that any radio call that was generated in the evacuation zone was assigned to crime suppression and response squads assigned to the incident.



Escorts

Throughout the incident, officers were asked to escort residents into the evacuation zone for a variety of reasons. In the beginning, escorts were conducted to allow evacuated residents to retrieve essential medication. Later, escorts were used to allow residents to return to their homes when the evacuation orders were amended.

Investigations

From the LAPD CP, officers and detectives were assigned to investigative squads under the Investigative Branch to process arrestees apprehended inside the evacuation zone and to provide advice on enforcement of laws, codes, and statutes specific to disaster areas. During the first weeks of the fire, the Department assigned command officers from specialized investigative divisions to lead the Investigative Branch out of the LAPD CP. Eventually, as the number of crimes decreased, the command officers were replaced by lieutenants with investigative experience.

In addition to the Investigative Branch that was deployed out of Will Rogers, specialized investigations were conducted by detectives from Robbery-Homicide Division (RHD), Major Crimes Division (MCD), and Commercial Crimes Division.

- Commercial Crimes Division was activated to assist with incidents of looting and impersonation of firefighters.
- Robbery-Homicide Division partnered with LASD's Homicide Bureau to develop consistent protocols for dealing with missing persons across the burn area. After presenting the Search and Recovery protocols to the Unified Incident Commanders, RHD assumed oversight and responsibility for all search and recovery efforts in the fire-affected areas. The Search and Recovery Group consisted of representatives from Cal Fire, LAPD, LASD, and the Los Angeles County Coroner's Office, to include forensic anthropologists and cadaver search dogs.
- Major Crimes Division and RHD partnered with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) to investigate the origin and cause of the fire.

Media Access

On January 9, after questions arose regarding whether or not media was allowed into the evacuation area, the LAPD CP issued clarified direction to ensure that members of the media were given access into the evacuation zone as stipulated in California Penal Code section 409.5 PC.¹⁸

¹⁸ California Penal Code Section 409.5 stipulates that credentialed members of the media cannot be prevented from accessing areas closed by natural disasters. Despite some early confusion regarding the requirement, this message was regularly communicated to all LAPD officers and California National Guard soldiers assigned to the Palisades Fire.



This topic was reinforced at subsequent briefings for the rest of the incident, and no major issues with media access were noted.

Curfew Order

On January 9 at 6:00 p.m., the County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors imposed a county-wide curfew for mandatory evacuation zones and evacuation warning zones in the cities of Los Angeles, Santa Monica, Malibu, and any unincorporated areas. The curfew order stipulated that no person should be on any public street, sidewalk, or other public place between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. The addition of the curfew gave the Department the authority to take enforcement action without the need to issue a warning ahead of time.

Arrival of the California National Guard

On January 9, California Governor Gavin Newsom activated the California National Guard (CNG) to help law enforcement secure the evacuation area and prevent looting. On the morning of January 10, a CNG Captain arrived at the LAPD CP and advised that 100 soldiers were responding to the incident and the CNG would be capable of deploying 50 soldiers on A-Watch and 50 soldiers on B-Watch.

When the soldiers first arrived, the guidelines dictating how the CNG could be deployed were not immediately clear, so the available soldiers were assigned to provide security around the LAPD CP.¹⁹ Eventually, the Department and the CNG were able to agree on specific roles and responsibilities, and CNG soldiers were assigned to high visibility fixed posts and TCPs.

The addition of the CNG allowed the Department to significantly reinforce its perimeter around the evacuation zone. Later in the incident, as the UCP extended the mandatory evacuation zone, the LAPD CP requested additional CNG soldiers to staff the increased TCPs.



¹⁹ The Department does not have codified policies that outline what responsibilities and assignments can be filled by CNG soldiers. See Critique: 6. National Guard Deployment



Mutual Aid

On the same day the CNG arrived, several law enforcement agencies from across the region responded to the LAPD CP to provide support. While their assistance did not allow the LAPD to rescind its Tactical Alert, it did significantly reduce the number of LAPD resources needed on a daily basis.

Operations Chief Returns to LAPD CP

On January 10 at 6:00 a.m., IMT-2 briefed IMT-1 on the status of the operation and IMT-1 assumed responsibility for the incident. Based on feedback they received from IMT-2, IMT-1 analyzed the effectiveness of having the OSC at the Unified Command at Zuma Beach and moved the OSC to the LAPD CP to allow for more effective command and control over operational decisions.²⁰

Support from the Off-Road Unit

On January 10 at 3:00 p.m., Cal Fire reported that firefighters on the backside of the Highlands were encountering pedestrians and individuals on e-bikes who were entering the evacuation zone on trails in the Santa Monica Mountains. To address the issue, the IMT placed a request through the DOC for assistance from the Operations-Valley Bureau Off-Road Unit to patrol the mountain areas that were inaccessible to police vehicles.²¹

West Valley and Brentwood Evacuations

On the afternoon of January 10, the UCP advised the LAPD CP that the evacuation area would be extended over the Santa Monica Mountains into the LAPD's West Valley Area. However, the UCP did not give specific locations, or a timeline for when the evacuation area would be extended, and no further directions were given to the LAPD.

This space was intentionally left blank

²⁰ At Zuma, the IC spent a significant amount of time in scheduled meetings with the other Unified Incident Commanders. To maintain communication with the LAPD CP, IMT-1 began sending the Deputy Incident Commander to Zuma along with the IC to ensure there was always someone with decision-making authority available.

²¹ On January 10th, the OVB Off-Road Unit responded with three units and a supervisor. To ensure continued police presence in the trails above the Palisades, they continued to deploy to the incident until the cancellation of the Tactical Alert.



Later that evening, around 7:00 p.m., shortly after IMT-1's B-Watch assumed command of the incident, the LAPD CP received a social media alert from the City indicating that residents on the eastside of the evacuation area (Brentwood) and the north side (Encino) should evacuate. Due to the exigency of the evacuation, the LAPD CP launched multiple squads to the Brentwood community, directing the squads to move southbound from Mulholland Drive to Sunset, and eastbound from Mandeville Canyon to the 405 Freeway.²²

The on-duty IMT-2 OSC was the Patrol Captain from the West Valley Area, who had a direct line of communication with the Area Captain from West Valley. The West Valley Area Captain was on scene, observing the fire spread over the hill towards Encino and Tarzana. As a precaution, the West Valley Area Captain had two squads of ten officers assembled in anticipation for evacuations. To assist with the evacuations in West Valley, the LAPD CP sent an additional four squads to support the West Valley Area Captain in carrying out the evacuation efforts.



In Brentwood, two Metropolitan Division squads, along with two squads from the Evacuation Group, worked quickly to evacuate both the Brentwood neighborhood and the Mountain Gate neighborhood to the north.²³ After evacuations were concluded, Metropolitan Division line platoons were primarily assigned to conduct high visibility suppression in the Brentwood neighborhood until the evacuation order was lifted.

Introduction of Genasys Zones

When the UCP extended the mandatory evacuation zone into West Valley and Brentwood, Cal Fire identified the areas that needed to be evacuated using the Genasys zone mapping system. The Genasys zone mapping system was completely unfamiliar to the LAPD. Genasys zones did not correlate with LAPD RDs and did not consistently align with neighborhoods or major streets. This


²² After the evacuations in Brentwood, residents in the area expressed significant concerns regarding the lack of notice and how the evacuations were conducted. While their concerns were valid, it should be noted that the LAPD was not given sufficient notice by the UCP, preventing the IMT from being able to properly plan for the large operation.

²³ Metropolitan Division line platoons and the Mounted Unit responded on the first day of the fire and continued to deploy to the incident well into the Tactical Alert.



made it difficult for the LAPD CP to direct units in the field to areas that needed to be evacuated or warned of an evacuation.

The UCPs use of the Genasys zones were also inconsistent. As an example, Cal Fire incident status reports show that Brentwood and Brentwood Heights (LOS-Q406-A and LOS-Q407) were moved in and out of mandatory evacuation status four times between January 10 and January 18. However, none of the Cal Fire evacuation maps indicated that those areas were ever upgraded to mandatory evacuation status.



Management of the Expanded Incident

The expansion of the fire into the West Valley area effectively forced the LAPD CP to manage two related, but geographically separated, incidents simultaneously. To maintain appropriate command and control, IMT-1 divided its resources into two separate branches under the Operations Section. Resources assigned to the Palisades were organized under the “West Branch” and resources assigned to the West Valley evacuations were organized under the “Valley Branch.” To staff the Valley Branch, the IMT requested an Operations-Valley Bureau captain and established a separate staging area at Portola Middle School.²⁴

²⁴ The valley staging area later moved to the Operations-Valley Bureau office when school resumed at Portola.




Managing the Valley Branch from the LAPD CP at Will Rogers created several challenges for the IMT. First, as the deployment to West Valley Area continued, the Valley Branch staging area was staffed by personnel from Operations-Valley Bureau who were not familiar with the standard check-in and demobilization process utilized by the Citywide IMT. Secondly, several Citywide IMTs reported multiple instances where Operations-Valley Bureau command and staff officers issued orders to Valley Branch squads that conflicted with directions given by the LAPD CP at Will Rogers.²⁵

Vehicle Impounds

The Department's Commission Investigation Division (CID) Official Police Garage (OPG) Section is responsible for the regulation of towing and storage of vehicles by the Department's 17 towing contractors. As the Department experts on vehicle towing, CID was responsible for coordinating the removal of vehicles that were left on major thoroughfares on the first day of the Palisades Fire.

Between January 16 and January 31, CID investigative teams conducted assessments on approximately 350 vehicles that were abandoned on streets within the Palisades.²⁶ Vehicles determined to be drivable were relocated to the side of the road when feasible or impounded to Quicksilver Tow if relocation was not possible. Vehicles that CID determined to be completely burned and inoperable were transported to SA Recycling for dismantling. In total, 231 vehicles were removed and destroyed, 21 were impounded, and 37 were relocated to the side of the road.



²⁵ Over the life of the incident, all three IMTs reported experiencing repeated challenges with chain-of-command and appropriate delegation of authority. *See Critique: 4. Chain of Command*

²⁶ CID created a detailed log of assessed vehicles that included pictures, location of vehicle, and all pertinent vehicle information.



Part Three: Repopulation (January 19th through February 4th)

West Valley Repopulation

On January 16, the UCP modified the evacuation orders in West Valley to allow residents to return to their homes. For two days, the LAPD CP deployed crime suppression squads and fixed posts for high visibility as residents returned to their homes. On January 18, as firefighters achieved a higher level of containment, the UCP lifted the mandatory evacuation order, and the area was designated as a warning zone only. With mandatory evacuations no longer in effect, IMT-1 demobilized the Valley Branch and returned to focusing solely on the Palisades recovery effort.²⁷

Activation of IMT-4

The first 12 days of the Palisades Fire were dynamic, mentally taxing, and physically demanding for personnel assigned to IMT-1 and IMT-2. To provide appropriate rest and allow the members of each Citywide IMT to spend more time at their regular area of assignment, the Department activated Citywide IMT-4 (IMT-4). With IMT-4 in the rotation, the three activated Citywide IMTs began a three-on, six-off rotation that lasted until the Tactical Alert ended.

Citywide IMT-4's first deployment to the Palisades Fire began at 6:00 a.m. on Sunday, January 19, 2025. In the week leading up to the deployment, IMT-4 met with their counterparts on IMT-1 and IMT-2 and conducted a site visit to the LAPD CP at Will Rogers to observe firsthand how the incident was being managed.

Repopulation of the Highlands (767-J)

On January 19, 2025, the UCP modified the evacuation orders in LOS-767-J to allow residents in the Palisades Highlands to return to their homes. This was a challenging shift in operational focus because LOS-767-J was only accessible through LOS-767-F, which was still under a mandatory evacuation order.

To safely facilitate resident access and prevent unauthorized entry, Santa Monica Parking Lot 3 North (Lot 3) was designated as a gathering point for anyone seeking to return to LOS-767-J. Inside Lot 3, individuals wishing to return to their homes were asked to provide proof of residency at an address that was cross-referenced with the Genasys Protect website to ensure only residents with verified addresses in LOS-767-J were allowed in. After being screened, CHP officers escorted residents through the closed area, into LOS-767-J, 10 cars at a time.²⁸


To organize traffic inside Lot 3, the Los Angeles Department of Transportation (LADOT) designed an intricate cone pattern to gather returning residents into lanes, while also providing a

²⁷ Cal Fire evacuation orders were inconsistent and contradictory. The IAP from January 18 indicates that January 17 was the last day the Valley Branch was staffed.

²⁸ The CHP handled escort responsibilities for a week before pulling their officers from the incident. When CHP left, the LAPD increased its daily deployment and assumed responsibility of the escorts.



route of egress for anyone who could not provide sufficient documentation. Despite the well thought out design, the number of people seeking to enter the parking lot spilled into the southbound lanes on Pacific Coast Highway, causing traffic congestion all the way to the California Incline. This backup was a temporary source of complaints from the community, but the congestion was minimized as officers assigned to the Repopulation Branch identified ways to move waiting entrants into the curb lane, freeing two lanes on southbound Pacific Coast Highway.



Address verification inside Lot 3 was handled by LAPD officers and volunteers from LAFD's Team Rubicon. To manage the re-entry process, the IMT added a Repopulation Branch to the organizational chart and increased the deployment of A-Watch by one lieutenant, three sergeants, and thirty officers. On B-Watch, the deployment was increased by one sergeant and ten officers who were assigned to securing Lot 3 overnight.

Assignment of Non-Coded Radio Calls

During a call with the Senior Staff on January 20, discrepancies arose regarding the number of burglary investigations being generated in the evacuation area. The Command Post was only reporting a handful of burglary calls, which was inconsistent with the numbers being officially reported to the Department. After working with Communications Division, it was determined that burglary investigations, which are non-coded, were still not being broadcasted because of the Tactical Alert. The issue was rectified with the help of the Communications Division Commanding Officer and no additional challenges were reported.

This space was intentionally left blank



Repopulation Orders Expand

Between January 19 and January 27, the UCP systematically amended the mandatory evacuation orders in the City of Los Angeles to allow more residents and their contractors to return to their homes. While escorts continued out of Lot 3, the LAPD CP worked with the CNG to build pass-checkpoints into their TCPs to verify that individuals returning to the area had the required passes. On January 30, when all of the necessary checkpoints were in place, the LAPD ceased providing escorts and residents were allowed to travel from Lot 3 back to their homes by presenting their passes at pre-designated checkpoints leading into the area.²⁹



Presidential Visit

On January 24, the President of the United States visited several areas in the Palisades and Malibu. The Presidential Visit was coordinated by Citywide IMT-3 (IMT-3), who was not assigned to the rotation of IMTs managing the Palisades Fire. On the day of the visit, IMT-2 coordinated with IMT-3 as the two incidents overlapped. The two IMTs managed the visit successfully, and there were no significant incidents to report.

Dissolution of the Unified Command

On January 28 at 8:00 a.m., Cal Fire turned over management of the incident to the Los Angeles Fire Department and the Zuma Beach Unified Command Post was demobilized.³⁰ At the time, the Palisades Fire had burned 23,448 acres, destroyed 6,837 structures, and taken the lives of 12 people.³¹

²⁹ The pass issuance and verification system that was developed over the course of the incident was consistently challenging. *See Critique: 9. Utilization of other City Agencies*

³⁰ <https://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2025/1/7/palisades-fire/updates/eb17c568-424c-4376-87c9-3e1bd6826d7f>

³¹ At the time of this report, only 5 deaths were reported in the City of Los Angeles. Those cause and circumstances of those deaths are still under investigation.



Tactical Alert Rescinded

When the UCP was demobilized, LAPD and LAFD moved all operations back to the Will Rogers State Beach staging area. With the fire generally under control, the LAPD CP reassessed its critical functions to look for ways to reduce the daily deployment of officers and allow the Department to rescind the Tactical Alert. At that point, the main law enforcement functions were perimeter security (TCPs) and crime suppression in the affected area. Despite the assistance from the CNG, the number of officers needed to staff the TCPs and provide crime suppression was still too high to allow the Tactical Alert to be canceled.

To allow the Department to resume normal operations, the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) agreed to assign a contingent of CHP officers to assist with crime suppression in the Palisades, allowing the LAPD to focus its deployment on staffing TCPs. After strategically reorganizing the location of the TCPs, the LAPD was able to decrease the daily field deployment to roughly 30 officers on each watch. To remove the need for on-duty resources altogether, the Department authorized the use of overtime to staff the Palisades.

On February 4, 2025, at 8:05 p.m., when the LAPD's Palisades deployment for the next day was moved entirely to overtime, the Department rescinded the 29-day Tactical Alert and resumed normal operations.³²

This space was intentionally left blank

³² According to the DOC Chronological Logs, the Tactical Alert started ended on February 4, 2025, at 8:05 p.m., and a DOC email was sent Departmentwide that operations had returned to normal.



Deaths and Injuries

Between the City of Los Angeles, the City of Malibu, and the unincorporated areas of Los Angeles County, Cal Fire reported that the Palisades Fire took the lives of 12 people, and injured three civilians and one firefighter.³³

Five of the 12 deaths occurred in the City of Los Angeles. The LAPD's Robbery-Homicide Division and Major Crimes Division are still investigating those cases in partnership with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Due to the ongoing investigation, further information is not available at this time.

This space was intentionally left blank

³³ <https://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2025/1/7/palisades-fire>



Crimes and Arrests

The mandatory evacuation of the Palisades left thousands of homes unattended, leaving the area vulnerable to criminal activity. From the first day the fire started, and throughout the entire incident, the Department focused heavily on crime suppression and went to extraordinary lengths to deter crime and arrest law violators.

The statistics below were extracted from within the boundaries of the Mandatory Evacuation Zones according to Cal Fire's evacuation maps and Cal Fire evacuation updates. The statistics are vulnerable to some error, as several zones were repeatedly moved in and out of mandatory evacuation status, but the changes were not included in the daily maps produced by the UCP.³⁴

Arrests in the Evacuation Zones	
January/February 2025*	
Los Angeles Police Department	
Charge	Count
409.5(c) PC – Enter Closed Disaster Area	4
8665 GC – State of Emergency Violation	3
459 PC – Burglary	2
182(a)(1) PC – Conspiracy to Commit Crime	2
538e(c) PC – Unauthorized Wearing of Fire Department Badge to Deceive	1
538d(a) PC – Impersonating a Police Officer	1
10851(a) VC (F) – Take Vehicle Without Owner's Consent	1
23152(a) VC – Driving Under the Influence	1
30305(a)(1) PC – Possession of Ammunition by Prohibited Person	1
41.24(a) LAMC – Trespass	1
594(b)(1) PC – Vandalism	1
69 PC – Resisting Executive Officer / Obstructing or Threatening Officer	1
Total Charges	19

*Time frames and locations

Q767 1/7/25 1230 to 1/19/25 1330

Q767 Sub Zones 1/19/25 @ 1330 to 2/4/25@2005

Q0765, Q0778, Q0780, Q0781, Q782, Q1118, Q0798 1/10/1845 to 1/16/25 1440

Q0762 1/10/25 @1845 to 01/19/25 @ 1330

Q0779 1/11/25 @0030 to 1/12/25 @ 0630

Q0406-A, Q0407, Q1115 1/10/25 @1845 to 1/14/25 @1850

Prepared by COMPSTAT on 4/15/25

³⁴ Specifically, LOS-Q0406-A, LOS-Q0407, and LOS-Q1115 were upgraded to mandatory evacuation then downgraded to warning-only four times. None of the archived Cal Fire maps show these zones as Mandatory Evacuation. The longest period the three zones show as being Mandatory Evacuation were from 01/11/25 at 6:15 p.m., to 01/14/25 at 6:50 p.m.



Crimes Reported in the Evacuation Zones	
January/February 2025*	
Los Angeles Police Department	
Crime Category	
Persons Crimes	
Robbery	1
Aggravated Assault	3
Total Persons Crimes	4
Property Crimes	
Burglary	24
Motor Vehicle Theft	6
Theft From Motor Vehicle	5
Theft	11
Total Property Crimes	46
Total Persons and Property Crimes	50
Other Crimes	
Weapons Violation	2
Simple Assault	3
Forgery	1
Vandalism	6
Identity Theft	10
Fraud	2
Other	16
Total Other	40
Total Offenses	90

***Time frames and locations**

Q767 1/7/25 1230 to 1/19/25 1330

Q767 Sub Zones 1/19/25 @ 1330 to 2/4/25@2005

Q0765, Q0778, Q0780, Q0781, Q782, Q1118, Q0798 1/10/1845 to 1/16/25 1440

Q0762 1/10/25 @1845 to 01/19/25 @ 1330

Q0779 1/11/25 @0030 to 1/12/25 @ 0630


Q0406-A, Q0407, Q1115 1/10/25 @1845 to 1/14/25 @1850

Prepared by COMPSTAT on 4/14/25



Property Damage

According to Cal Fire, the Palisades Fire destroyed 6,837 structures, and damaged an additional 973 structures.



Further information and a detailed map of the damaged area can be found on Cal Fire's website.³⁵



This space was intentionally left blank

³⁵ <https://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2025/1/7/palisades-fire>



Personnel

The extended Tactical Alert allowed the Department to dedicate a significant number of personnel to the incident on a daily basis.



Analysis

Deployment to the Palisades Fire was the highest on January 12, when the LAPD was deployed to the Palisades, Brentwood, and West Valley. At this point in time, the Department was holding the fire perimeter, conducting crime suppression, responding to calls for service, and conducting investigations. After the Valley Branch was demobilized, daily deployment was slowly reduced until the repopulation phase, when additional officers were needed to distribute passes and provide escorts.



Deployment by Rank

	A- Watch						B-Watch					
	MOU 25	LT	SUPV	OFCR	CIV	TOT	MOU 25	LT	SUPV	OFCR	CIV	TOT
7-Jan	1	0	16	122	1	140	0	2	13	81	2	98
8-Jan	6	8	76	290	11	391	1	4	19	101	5	130
9-Jan	9	7	55	163	6	240	2	8	29	135	4	178
10-Jan	5	10	64	186	12	277	5	5	41	208	6	265
11-Jan	10	10	45	311	8	384	7	8	45	308	17	385
12-Jan	18	20	115	375	17	545	9	9	58	351	21	448
13-Jan	10	15	74	282	15	396	5	16	47	326	12	406
14-Jan	10	16	68	351	7	452	4	15	43	320	13	395
15-Jan	10	18	76	309	8	421	3	12	42	297	6	360
16-Jan	8	19	87	299	18	431	6	7	51	308	12	384
17-Jan	12	17	68	282	18	397	4	10	47	283	6	350
18-Jan	11	19	65	251	18	364	6	10	43	264	6	329
19-Jan	15	16	70	232	9	342	4	11	40	260	7	322
20-Jan	6	14	83	266	10	379	1	10	41	276	9	337
21-Jan	8	16	67	270	8	369	3	8	34	222	7	274
22-Jan	8	13	63	262	7	353	2	12	33	221	7	275
23-Jan	8	17	54	255	8	342	2	9	26	155	6	198
24-Jan	9	15	49	208	8	289	2	10	27	191	5	235
25-Jan	7	15	40	198	8	268	5	6	27	139	5	182
26-Jan	6	11	31	176	9	233	5	5	29	148	5	192
27-Jan	7	15	30	223	5	280	5	6	28	152	7	198
28-Jan	8	11	38	194	8	259	3	7	20	128	6	164
29-Jan	7	11	41	203	8	270	3	6	21	100	6	136
30-Jan	6	9	31	153	5	204	2	6	18	104	6	136
31-Jan	6	12	49	222	6	295	1	8	16	159	5	189
1-Feb	6	7	31	178	9	231	2	7	19	122	2	152
2-Feb	5	8	25	171	9	218	2	6	19	117	5	149
3-Feb	7	6	21	70	5	109	5	3	14	56	7	85
4-Feb	6	9	18	72	9	114	5	4	16	57	7	89

Note: The number above includes personnel assigned to the EOC and DOC during the Palisades Fire. MOU 25 refers to Command Officers. “LT” represents Lieutenants, “SUPV” represents Supervisors, “OFCR” represents Officers, “CIV” represents Civilians, and “TOT” represents the total number of personnel.



Logistics

The Palisades Fire resulted in the largest deployment of emergency first responders in the history of the City of Los Angeles. To support this response, the Department, in cooperation with numerous City, county, and state entities, undertook the most expansive logistics operation in the Department's history.

Communications: Network -Radio and Cellular

Emergency Command Control Communication Systems Division (ECCCS) worked with the Information Technology Agency (ITA) to assess and repair radio communications systems. Due to power disruptions and damage to the radio repeater site, repairs and restoration of full radio communications were delayed.

To restore cellular service in the area, logistics personnel coordinated the deployment of multiple Satellite Cell on Light Truck (SatCOLT), Cell On Wheels (COW), and Compact Rapid Deployable (CRD) trailers. The FirstNet prototype Low Earth Orbit Compact Trailer was also deployed. These resources provided a patchwork network of cellular service for deployed personnel. Cellular service was stabilized by installing new fiber optic cables and installing cellular towers at Will Rogers State Beach by Verizon and AT&T.

Location of Command Post

On the first day, LAFD and LAPD established Unified Command Posts at three different locations:

1. Fire Station 23: 17281 Sunset Boulevard;
2. Will Rogers State Beach: Pacific Coast Highway & Sunset Boulevard; and,
3. Will Rogers State Beach: 15100 Pacific Coast Highway.

On January 8, 2025, Cal Fire established a multi-jurisdictional regional Unified Command Post at Zuma Beach in the City of Malibu:

4. Zuma Beach: 3000 Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu CA.

Staging Area and Base Camp

The Staging Area, including work areas for Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Admin/Finance, remained at Will Rogers State Beach. To support Department operations, logistics personnel deployed Mobile-3, Mobile-5, and Mobile Command Post Vehicles from Newton Area, West Los Angeles Area, and the Auxiliary Department Operations Center (ADOC). The LAFD deployed their Command-2 and Logistics Support trucks.



Staging Area for Allied Agencies

As the City's response increased, personnel from the Los Angeles World Airport Police Department, Los Angeles Port Police, and Los Angeles School Police Department responded to the incident and staged their respective command post vehicles at Will Rogers State Beach.

Ground Support

During the initial incident, Logistics developed a plan for vehicles to transport personnel. A visit to Los Angeles by the President of the United States (POTUS) had just ended. All of the vehicles assigned to the POTUS event, consisting of 20 black and white police patrol vehicles and ten transport vans, were redirected and sent to the Staging Area.

Two Critical Incident Utility Vehicles (CIUV) were deployed to support the incident in refuse disposal and other miscellaneous duties.

Support of Personnel

Security at the Staging Area was maintained by installing a 2,000-foot (approximate) security fence that was patrolled by the CNG. The fencing was funded by the Cal OES. Lighting around the staging area was provided by mobile 16 light trailers.

At the highest volume, the area provided logistical support for approximately 800 personnel from numerous agencies. The agencies included all City law enforcement agencies, LAFD, LADOT, Los Angeles Water and Power (LADWP), California Highway Patrol (CHP), California National Guard, and numerous Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO). The support included food and water; sanitation and trash removal; and, janitorial and restroom services. Several sleeping trailers were provided by Cal OES. Four large capacity power generators were deployed at various times. Department computers, printers, cell phones, Wi-Fi networks, and other electronic equipment were deployed.

Approximately five TCPs required the deployment of a Cell-on-Wheels trailer to augment cellular service, and approximately 11 TCPs required a light trailer to illuminate the area during hours of darkness.

An extensive fuel plan was developed and executed to maintain the operations of all of the vehicles and trailers deployed to the incident. Fueling schedules were maintained as the incident required a 24/7 schedule. Administrative supplies for all shifts were shipped and stored in various areas.

Various plans and contingencies were developed for the duration of the incident. These plans included weather event tracking, food safety, traffic control, pedestrian access, security control, medical emergency evacuation, environmental safety, electrical distribution, consumable supply replenishment, communications, and parking. A cache of personal protective equipment (PPE) appropriate for brushfires was maintained and distributed to all responding personnel.



Notable Dates

January 7

- Logistics personnel began planning and preparation to support operations.
- Operations-West Bureau established command of the incident.
- Mobile-3 and one light trailer are deployed.

January 8

- FirstNet Satellite Cell on Light Truck (SatCOLT) and Cell On Wheels (COW) are deployed at the Staging Area.

January 9

- Re-assessment of Command Post and Staging Area was conducted by IMT-1 Logistics.
- Update of the CP and Staging began.

January 10

- Plans Trailer is moved from Zuma Beach to Will Rogers State Beach.
- Staging Area redesign and rebuild were completed.
- Food Unit established.
- FirstNet prototype Low Earth Orbit Compact Trailer installed at Staging Area.

January 12

- Plan for security fencing was established.

January 15

- Two Critical Incident Utility Vehicles were delivered at the Staging Area.
- Total personnel at the location reached approximately 800 people.

January 16

- Additional Compact Rapid Deployable (CRD) cellular trailers were deployed into the burn area.

January 24

- Los Angeles World Airport Police Department and Los Angeles Port Police Department trailers left the Staging Area.
- Food services begin shutdown of operations.



Critique

The Los Angeles Police Department has extensive experience managing high profile pre-planned events, complex tactical incidents, and large protests. Through repetition at these types of occurrences, the LAPD has developed strong working relationships with various agencies in the City family, specifically with LAFD and LADOT. The continued practice of handling events in Unified Command with LAFD and LADOT has created strong working relationships with key personnel and an understanding of each organization's operational preferences.

However, the Department has little experience working with agencies outside of the City of Los Angeles, especially in dynamic disaster response scenarios. Therefore, the Department's involvement in the Palisades Fire should be viewed as a valuable learning opportunity. This section of the report seeks to identify those areas where there is room for improvement and provide actionable steps the Department can take in order to be more successful in future scenarios.

To identify significant challenges and poignant topics for future improvement, command and general staff members from the Citywide IMTs were asked to complete a survey and participate in debriefs. The topics and recommendations discussed in the survey and debriefs are listed below.

Note: The Department has already begun working to resolve several of the issues that were identified in the preparation of this report. Topics and recommendations that are already being resolved will be designated as "In-Progress."

1. Communications Infrastructure and Technology

Findings: During the Palisades Fire, critical infrastructure supporting Land Mobile Radio (LMR) and cellular connectivity in the affected area was destroyed on the first day of the incident, effectively crippling the emergency responder's ability to coordinate and communicate as the fire spread through the Palisades and Malibu. Consequently, LAPD personnel assigned to the Zuma Beach UCP struggled to effectively communicate with personnel assigned at the LAPD CP.

Additionally, the LAPD was unable to share radio frequencies with other law enforcement agencies who responded to the fire. The inability to directly communicate with other agencies created unnecessary challenges and operational delays.

1.1 Recommendation: Improve LMR infrastructure to enhance radio reception in the Palisades and any other areas in the City with poor LMR coverage.

1.2 Recommendation: Continue to test the FirstNet cellular system to determine if FirstNet has the capability to effectively manage the increase in cellular traffic generated during large scale disasters. If it is determined that FirstNet does not



have the capability to handle and prioritize cellular connectivity for first responders, the Department should explore other vendors. *(In-Progress)*

1.3 Recommendation: Work with FirstNet to develop ground-level protocols for addressing problems with cellular connectivity – identify and clearly document what equipment is available and how to request it. *(In-Progress)*

1.4 Recommendation: Partner with local law enforcement agencies to identify a fallback radio frequency that can be utilized during mutual aid situations.

2. Initial Coordination with LAFD

Findings: On January 7, coordination between LAPD and LAFD was poor considering the two agencies were supposed to be in Unified Command. Though both agencies were co-located at the same CP, the two departments did not collectively establish a unified command structure or identify shared objectives, missions, or strategies.

According to FEMA's National Incident Management System (NIMS), when participating in a Unified Command, involved agencies should jointly determine priorities and objectives, allocate resources, and work together to ensure the expectation of integrated incident operations and maximize the use of assigned resources.³⁶

2.1 Recommendation: Staff and command officers from the Department's four geographic bureaus should be required to participate in yearly training exercises with their LAFD counterparts. Exercises should focus on common weather driven disasters or potential catastrophic incidents specific to the involved geographic Area.³⁷

2.2 Recommendation: Emergency Services Division's Critical Incident Management course should continue to be mandatory for all staff and command officers. The Department should amend the Critical Incident Management course to include additional emphasis on how the LAPD and LAFD can effectively collaborate to establish a true Unified Command organizational structure.

3. Documentation

Findings: The OWB IMTs that managed the incident on the first day did not adhere to some of the standard ICS procedures taught by the Department: no chronological log was kept; the number of officers tracked in the CP did not match the number of officers documented on

³⁶ https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/fema_nims_doctrine-2017.pdf

³⁷ In 2024, the LAPD and other City agencies participated in a large-scale wildfire exercise in Operations-Valley Bureau. Similar exercises should be held in the other three geographic Bureaus. Unified Command structure and standard organizational roles should be a primary focus.



ICS 211s; and, assigned personnel were not immediately organized under branches, groups, or strike teams. While it is understandable that the life-threatening situation at hand took precedence over the completion of administrative documentation, the absence of standard ICS organization resulted in diminished situational awareness for Citywide IMT-2 when they assumed command of the incident on January 8.

When the mandatory evacuation zone extended into West Valley Area, a secondary staging location was established at Portola Middle school, and later moved to Operations-Valley Bureau. When the secondary staging area was moved to Operations-Valley Bureau, it was staffed by personnel who were not assigned to one of the Citywide IMTs. These personnel were unfamiliar with the standard check-in and demobilization procedures used by the Citywide IMTs; specifically, they kept paper records and did not utilize the 211 OS System according to Department policy.³⁸ This prevented the LAPD CP from accurately tracking the number of personnel assigned to the incident.

During the preparation of this report, it was discovered that the Citywide IMTs did not systematically create and retain critical documentation related to operational decision making and daily challenges. Outside of IAPs, chronological logs, and ICS 211/214s, there was sparse information on the deployment of resources, expansion of evacuation areas, and agreements made between involved agencies. Periodic snapshots of the SitStat board were not retained, chronological logs lacked sufficient context for operational decisions, and an official log of daily communications between the Citywide IMTs and Department command staff was not kept. Under ICS, these responsibilities fall to the PSC, and are generally given to the Documentation Unit Leader.

- 3.1 Recommendation:** The Department should continue to provide mandated ICS training to all supervisory ranks and emphasize the requirement to utilize standard ICS principles during management of all critical incidents.³⁹
- 3.2 Recommendation:** All four geographic bureaus should have cadres trained in standard check-in and demobilization procedures.
- 3.3 Recommendation:** The Department should recirculate the Office of Operations Notice that encourages the use of the 211 OS to clarify that use of the system is mandatory and provide training to the Special Event Units at all four geographic bureaus.

³⁸ Office of Operations Notice, *Utilization of the 211 Operating System*, dated December 29, 2023.

³⁹ All Department supervisors are mandated to attend specific ICS courses based on their rank. Additionally, all Citywide IMT members are mandated to attend all levels of standard ICS training, including TEEX.



3.4 Recommendation: Citywide IMTs should be required to staff the Documentation Unit Leader position in the same way the Resources Unit Leader and the Situation Unit Leader are staffed.

3.5 Recommendation: Citywide IMTs should use the ICS 209, *Incident Status Summary*, to document and communicate critical incident information.

4. Chain of Command

Findings: Over the course of the incident, command and staff officers assigned throughout the organization attempted to give direction to the LAPD Incident Commander, and on occasion, to the LAPD Operations Chief. All three Citywide IMTs reported frustrations with the DOC, EOC, and geographic bureaus attempting to assert authority or request information. During the dynamic phase of the incident, these interferences were a distraction and created operational challenges.

According to NIMS, an Incident Commander should receive policy direction from the “Senior Official” (referred to as the “Agency Administrator” in ICS). While the Senior Official is ultimately responsible for the incident, having responsibility for the incident does not mean that the Senior Official assumes a command role over the on-scene incident operation. Rather, the Senior Official:

- Provides delegation of authority to an Incident Commander or Unified Command. This delegation of authority assigns the Incident Commander specific responsibilities and authorities. The Incident Commander is accountable to the Senior Official, but has the complete authority to direct the tactical, on-scene operation.
- Provides policy guidance on priorities and objectives based on situational needs.
- Oversees resource coordination and support to the on-scene command through the EOC.⁴⁰

During the Palisades Fire, the role of Senior Official was not understood by several command and staff officers who attempted to assert authority over the incident.

4.1 Recommendation: When the Citywide IMTs are activated, the Department should clearly define who is acting in the role of Senior Official and has the authority to give guidance to the Citywide IMT’s Incident Commander.

⁴⁰ F 0402: NIMS Overview for Senior Officials, FEMA.



- 4.2 Recommendation:** The Senior Official should implement standardized reporting and communication procedures to allow for seamless sharing of information.⁴¹

5. Zone Mapping

Findings: The UCP utilized the Genasys Protect mapping system to organize the affected area into zones that could be easily communicated to the public using free mobile apps. The LAPD was never introduced to the system, which proved problematic when the mandatory evacuations were pushed into West Valley Area and Brentwood. However, once the IMTs became familiar with the system, it proved to be an efficient tool for sending evacuation warnings to the community. Currently, the Department is working with LAFD and EMD to use Genasys Protect for City operations.

- 5.1 Recommendation:** Continue to utilize the Genasys Protect system and provide training to the Department IMTs on specific uses and abilities. *(In-Progress)*

6. National Guard Deployment

Findings: When the CNG arrived at the LAPD CP to provide support, the Citywide IMT running the operation was not immediately provided with clear guidelines that stipulated how the CNG could be deployed, and what their limitations were. Though an agreement was eventually reached and rules for deployment were solidified, the delay could have been avoided if the CNGs deployment limitations were known ahead of time.

- 6.1 Recommendation:** Adhere to the policy and procedures as detailed within the LAPD Emergency Operations Guide, Volume 7, Mutual Aid Briefing Handbook.

7. Effectiveness of the Citywide IMTs

Discussion: The deployment of Citywide IMTs at the Palisades Fire was generally successful. The three-day rotation allowed IMT members to gain valuable experience managing a large-scale incident with multiple operational periods. During IMT specific debriefs and the after-action survey, the following recommendations were provided specific to the use of Citywide IMTs:

- 7.1 Finding & Recommendation:** Initially, each Citywide IMT made unilateral operational decisions without consulting with the other involved Incident Commanders. This was confusing for partnering agencies and officers who were repeatedly assigned to the incident. In similar scenarios where more than one Citywide IMT is utilized, improved communication between the Incident Commanders can help achieve a higher level of operational consistency.

⁴¹ Future utilization of the ICS 209 referenced Recommendation 3.5 would streamline information sharing and communication.



- 7.2 Finding & Recommendation:** Several section chiefs reported that they did not have access to trained personnel to support their section's objectives. The Department should develop cadres of officers who are trained to support logistics, staging, and check-in/demobilization. When necessary, those cadres should be activated, and the incident should become their primary duty assignment to alleviate conflicts with their areas of assignment. *(In-Progress)*
- 7.4 Finding & Recommendation:** After meeting with Cal OES, the Finance and Administration Section Chiefs developed a clear understanding of the type of documentation needed for cost-recovery. The 211 OS and IMT SharePoint site are foundational to the workflow that was developed. The Department should continue to provide training to Citywide IMTs and Special Events Units on the how to properly capture and document the required information for successful cost-recovery. *(In-Progress)*

8. Logistical Support

Findings: While the Zuma UCP was active, Cal Fire and LAFD provided meals, restrooms, hygiene stations, and fencing to support operations being run out of the LAPD CP. The logistical support provided by the other Unified Command agencies was drastically superior to the resources available to the Department after Cal Fire and LAFD left the incident.

Additionally, the length of the incident has highlighted the need for new technology and equipment. Emergency Services Division (ESD) responded to the CP on the first day and supported the various IMTs throughout the incident to the best of their abilities. However, the equipment, technology, vehicles, and trailers provided by ESD are not designed for prolonged deployment and the equipment has begun to deteriorate. Furthermore, the deployment of so many of ESD's mobile response vehicles has limited their ability to support the Department's normal operations.

Lastly, it was reported that officers did not have access to proper safety equipment during the initial response. While ESD was quick to respond to the LAPD CP with masks, goggles, and gloves, by the time they arrived it was too late to distribute fire PPE to units who were already engaged in evacuations in the field.

- 8.1 Recommendation:** The Department needs a budget line item to contract meals, equipment, and vehicles for long term deployments.
- 8.2 Recommendation:** Increase the number of vehicles and specialized equipment available for unusual occurrences.



- 8.3 Recommendation:** All patrol vehicles should be equipped with a standard kit of natural disaster equipment.

9. Utilization of other City Agencies

Findings: The LAPD was assigned several responsibilities that fell outside of the Department's primary functions at a brushfire incident. Though the Department is committed to working hand in hand with other City agencies, it is important that the entire City family be utilized during a large-scale disaster. When the UCP at Zuma Beach was demobilized, the LAPD ended up being the only City agency with a consistent presence at Will Rogers. In the absence of other City agencies, the LAPD was left responsible for a myriad of responsibilities that could have been handled more efficiently by other entities.

- The LA Sanitation and LADOT have equipment and expertise that would have expedited the removal of burned vehicles that were blocking the roadway. The CID reported that LA Sanitation was willing to assist but never received a request from the EOC.
- During the repopulation phase, another City department (EMD, the council district, or the Mayor's Office) should have been given primary responsibility for screening residents and distributing passes from the start. The LAPD did not have the equipment or supplies needed to facilitate the early repopulation process.⁴²
- The LADOT's expertise with traffic control and traffic engineering would have made them better suited to work with CalTrans to improve traffic flow around the evacuation area after residents were allowed back into their homes.

- 9.1 Recommendation:** Ensure that all relevant City agencies are actively involved and represented in the Unified Command structure through the completion of the recovery phase of a natural disaster incident.

10. Command Post Location

Discussion: During the first day of the Palisades Fire, the Command Post was moved several times as the fire spread, and the size of the Unified Command expanded. When the fire first broke out on the morning of January 7, LAFD set up a Command Post at Fire Station 23, near the intersection of Sunset Boulevard and Los Liones. The LAPD resources responded to the fire station to work with LAFD on evacuations in areas facing imminent danger. However, as the fire continued to rapidly spread, intense smoke, heat, and low visibility began to interrupt

⁴² Later in the incident, EMD and the Mayor's Office took over the responsibility for pass distribution and set up a pass-distribution center at an offsite location.



operations at Fire Station 23 and the Command Post was moved to the northern side of Will Rogers State Beach near the intersection of Sunset and Pacific Coast Highway.

As night approached on the January 7, the fire continued to push west towards the Pacific Ocean, igniting the dry vegetation on the hillside across Pacific Coast Highway from the Command Post. With winds gust still reaching 80 miles per hour, smoke and hot embers from the fire were blown across Pacific Coast Highway, into the area where the LAPD and LAFD were coordinating operations. While the Unified Command was well aware that the location of the Command Post at Will Rogers was far from ideal, LAPD and LAFD Logistics personnel were unable to locate a better alternative. Santa Monica Lot 3 North had physical barriers that prevented the large Command Post vehicles from being able to enter the lot; a full shutdown of Pacific Coast Highway near the McClure tunnel would have impacted ingress and egress into the disaster area; and, the Santa Monica Airport, the Ahmanson Recruit Training Center, and the Federal Reserve Building were too far away to effectively manage the response with a communications blackout.

Ultimately, the Los Angeles Fire Department made the decision that Will Rogers State Beach was the best solution when all factors were considered. To protect the Command Post, LAFD staged fire engines on Pacific Coast Highway to prevent the fire from jumping across highway. While this solution protected the structures and equipment from catching fire, it did nothing to protect the first responders assigned to the Command Post from the smoke, embers, and ashes that engulfed the area.

The next day, after Cal Fire arrived and was designated as the lead agency in the Unified Command, the Unified Command Post was relocated to Zuma Beach in Malibu, to a large parking lot that could accommodate all the involved agencies. Though the Zuma location was convenient for a majority of the Unified Command agencies, it created several challenges for the LAPD. Most notably, Zuma Beach could not be used to stage and deploy Department resources due to its distance from the area of operation and the City. This forced the LAPD to continue using Will Rogers as a staging area. While it is not unusual for the Command Post and Staging Area to be bifurcated, the communications blackout made communication between the UCP and the staging area difficult.

This space was intentionally left blank



Chronological Log

The following timeline was compiled from several Department sources. This includes the lists of events from CAD incident logs, radio frequency recordings, CP and DOC chronological logs, IMT debriefs, and group interviews with key personnel.

Tuesday, January 7, 2025

OWB IMT

- 1023 hours** The first fire-related radio call was generated by Communications Division. Incident No. 25010700001693 at 1224 Piedra Morada Drive in the Pacific Palisades Highlands. Minutes later, another radio call was generated at 16597 Calle Victoria, also in the Highlands. These calls were not broadcast on West LA base frequency.
- 1024 hours** A West LA XL unit noticed several fire engines driving code-three towards the Highlands. The unit inquired about a possible fire with Communications. Communications confirmed a report of a fire. The officer informed Communications that he would respond to the fire's location.
- Upon arriving at the scene, the officer assessed the size and intensity of the fire and requested three additional units to respond code-three.
- 1053 hours** LAFD notified Communications to advise responding LAPD units that a Command Post (CP) had been set up at Fire Station 23, 17281 Sunset Boulevard, down the hill from the Palisades Highlands.
- 1105 hours** A West LA supervisor, while enroute to the unit's location, spotted smoke and stopped at the intersection of Via Floresta and Floresta Place. He requested additional units to respond code-two for evacuations.
- 1114 hours** A West LA supervisor declared a Citywide Tactical Alert and requested 12 units and an Air Unit.
- 1117 hours** Air Units were unable to respond due to the weather.
- 1119 hours** Units were requested for traffic control at Pacific Coast Highway (PCH) and Sunset to block north/south traffic and to Palisades and Sunset.
- 1120 hours** Communications RTO broadcasts the Citywide Tac Alert.
- 1124 hours** A tactical frequency is requested to facilitate clearer communication among officers during the evacuation. All officers assigned to the incident were instructed to switch to Citywide Tac 2, Channel 40.



- 1127 hours** A West LA supervisor requested that the CP coordinate with LAFD and provide an evacuation plan. The supervisor requested that responding units respond to evacuation areas instead of the CP.
- Neighborhoods requiring evacuation were Bienveneda, Via Floresta, Bell Oceana, Shadow Mountain Drive, and El Hito.
- 1130 hours** The West LA Patrol Commanding Officer (Commander 8B) arrived at the CP and assumed the role of Incident Commander (IC).
- 1136 hours** A West LA supervisor requested six units to Bienveneda and El Hito for evacuations.
- 1140 hours** A West LA supervisor reported a major traffic block on Bienveneda. He requested units respond northbound to move the one-mile-long traffic backup.
- 1142 hours** The West LA Watch Commander arrived at the CP.
- 1145 hours** A West LA supervisor requested all east and westbound traffic to be stopped at Bienveneda and Sunset until Bienveneda was emptied; vehicles were in the fire area.
- 1148 hours** The West LA Watch Commander advised that the CP was moving to PCH south of Will Rogers Park because the fire at Sunset and Castellammare was getting too close.
- 1148 hours** Per School PD, students from Marquez Charter Elementary were evacuated by bus to Brentwood Elementary School, and students from Paul Revere Charter were bussed to University High School.
- 1150 hours** Fourteen additional units were enroute to the CP.
- 1151 hours** A unit requested a Rescue Ambulance for a 92 year-old female who was inside her residence with a caretaker at 1375 Lackman Drive.
- 1152 hours** LAFD requested that PCH and Temescal be shut down in both directions.
- 1152 hours** A West LA supervisor advised units to expedite clearing Sunset for all exits; eastbound Las Pulgas was blocked.
- 1154 hours** LAFD requested a hard closure from PCH to the Highlands – do not let anyone through.



- 1155 hours** The IC coordinated evacuations, assigned more units to traffic control points, and advised that the CP was moving to Will Rogers Beach, near the intersection of PCH and Temescal.
- 1159 hours** There was a report of gridlock on Palisades near Calvary Christian School, and fire was on both sides of Palisades Drive.
- 1210 hours** A West LA supervisor requested that PCH and Sunset be open to all exit traffic. Traffic at Palisades and Sunset needed to be clear for the fire engines to move.
- 1213 hours** The new CP was moved to PCH/Sunset. Commander 8B arrived at the new CP and continued the IC role.
- 1221 hours** Operations-West Bureau Commander (Staff 27B) requested the incoming MFF stage at the CP.
- 1228 hours** CHP requested LAPD shut down southbound traffic on PCH at Coastline. A West LA sergeant advised that PCH needed to stay open as an exit route. CHP was notified.
- 1235 hours** The CP was advised that an additional six supervisors and 60 officers would respond to the CP. The 6Q190 series responded.
- 1240 hours** Per LA County Fire, at 1666 Calle Arbola, a 95 years-old male was unable to evacuate.
- 1251 hours** A West LA unit requested that Santa Monica PD be contacted to direct traffic on PCH and California Incline to relieve PCH traffic.
- 1252 hours** A unit advised that there would be an evacuation on Sunset, and there was complete gridlock. They requested a way to allow people to come down Bienveneda.
- 1255 hours** A West LA unit requested a Radio Telephone Operation (RTO) on the TAC frequency.

The CP directed officers to push all traffic southbound towards PCH and for everyone to go downhill in a southbound direction. A West LA unit advised the CP that LAFD was not allowing them to go southbound.

A West LA supervisor advised the CP that everyone in the highly dense area coming south had been evacuated.



- 1257 hours** The Communications Division BCC advised all units that evacuees on Palisades should be directed southbound.
- 1258 hours** The Olympic Patrol Commanding Officer (Commander 20B) showed enroute from Vermont and Washington to CP.
- 1258 hours** Officer Needs Help: A West LA unit responded to a call at 1644 Lackmen Lane, down a fire road where visibility was extremely low. Since they did not respond, officers believed the unit may have been overtaken by fire, and other officers could not locate them. A West LA supervisor advised not to send additional officers to rescue and to get LAFD to respond with a helicopter.
- 1300 hours** Staff 27B arrived at the CP and assumed IC. The primary mission was to carry out evacuations.
- 1302 hours** A West LA supervisor requested that PCH and Sunset be clear of traffic due to smoke and near-zero visibility. If safe, the CP advised units directing traffic on PCH and Sunset to direct northbound or southbound.
- 1303 hours** The Santa Monica PD WC advised they would send two traffic control units to PCH and the California Incline.
- 1304 hours** A West LA supervisor requested that CHP initiate their traffic plan on Topanga Canyon.
- 1305 hours** A West LA supervisor requested four additional units to respond to Sunset and Palisades. The fire jumped the street, and motorists stranded there may be in danger.
- 1306 hours** A West LA supervisor advised units on Palisades and Sunset to have drivers exit their vehicles and evacuate on foot.
- 1306 hours** A Code-4 on the Officer Needs Help call.
- 1310 hours** The CP advised that since the fire jumped the road at Palisades Drive and Sunset, residents should exit their vehicles and evacuate on foot. Units directing evacuees on foot were advised to direct them westbound on Sunset towards PCH.
- 1312 hours** A West LA unit requested units to respond northbound on Sunset to Palisades. Vehicles needed to be evacuated because they were burning.

A unit reported that they were prepared to respond to the area of Sunset and Palisades. However, a fire broke out on the north side of the street, forcing them to evacuate of the area.



- 1315 hours** A West LA supervisor instructed all the units C6 at Sunset and Palisades to relocate further west because the fire was about to jump the street again.
- 1316 hours** CHP advised they were unable to assist with school bus escorts.
- 1317 hours** Units staged on Sunset and Paseo Miramar requested an additional squad to assist with evacuating a four-story apartment complex with multiple units.
- 1319 hours** Units advised they could not evacuate the Sunset and Paseo Miramar apartment building due to the fire, and the units left the area.
- 1319 hours** LAFD advised that the new staging location was at Temescal and PCH.
- 1320 hours** A unit requested confirmation on LAFD's staging area; he had six firetrucks waiting for the staging location.
- 1329 hours** A unit advised officers driving down PCH to drive on the opposite side of the road due to the fire.
- 1334 hours** A unit advised the CP that Fire Station #23 (the original CP location) was on fire.
- 1335 hours** Commander 20B arrived at the CP.
- 1336 hours** There were reports that westbound Sunset from Palisades Drive was blocked with LAFD fire engines while fighting a fire there. Commander 8A advised units that westbound Sunset from Palisades was blocked and to redirect evacuees eastbound on Sunset.
- 1342 hours** A citizen reported a large vehicle gridlock at Sunset and Chautauqua and no police or DOT officers at the scene.
- 1343 hours** CHP requested that LAPD shut down traffic at PCH and Coastline as CHP had no units available to handle.
- 1352 hours** A radio call was broadcast at 1454 Palisades for a 94 year-old female with limited mobility who requested assistance with evacuation.
- 1359 hours** LAFD requested that the LAPD assist trapped drivers in the area of 1230 Pedro Morada Dr.; the road was blocked by abandoned vehicles.
- LAFD attempted water drops in the area.
- 1400 hours** A unit requested Bluffside and PCH to open for traffic due to heavy congestion.



A West LA sergeant advised that traffic on Bluffside and PCH could not be opened at this time due to multiple vehicles and LAFD fighting an active fire.

- 1400 hours** A West LA Detective requested a phone number for civilians to contact the CP. Residents reported they did not have power or internet service and were trying to get updates. They requested a phone number where they could get information.
- 1400 hours** A unit reported that at 17647 Posetano Road, between Marina and PCH, the house was surrounded by flames, and three people could be seen on the roof from PCH. Evacuation was needed.
- 1405 hours** A citizen reported people were abandoning their vehicles on Palisades Drive between Palisades Circle and Sunset.
- 1425 hours** Multiple calls were generated for evacuation assistance. The first calls were for the elderly. The calls quickly increased to include family, friends, and neighbors who could not reach their loved ones and requested assistance. Communications created a master incident for evacuations only.
- 1427 hours** Units were advised that west of Marquez, roads were completely blocked off due to citizen and LAFD vehicles, and they were requested to evacuate eastbound.
- 1435 hours** A Metropolitan Division Commanding Officer advised that 2+12 from Mounted were responding to help with horse recovery, and a 2+20 from the line platoons was also enroute to assist with the fire.
- 1437 hours** At 19932 PCH, an elderly couple requested assistance with evacuation.
- 1437 hours** Units escorted over 100 vehicles southbound out of the Palisades area.
- 1455 hours** Units were advised to use caution; all residences on Overdrive were on fire, and the powerlines were down.
- 1457 hours** The West LA Watch Commander advised they were not taking any addresses for evacuation at the time.
- 1500 hours** The bulldozer arrived at Palisades Dr. and Sunset to clear a path for emergency vehicles.
- 1521 hours** A unit requested additional units to Malibu Mobile Home for a fire at the location with residents that were still inside.



2025 Palisades Fire

After-Action Report

- 1544 hours** A unit reported fire and smoke heading towards Temescal and Sunset, near Palisades High School, with many trees on fire at the high school.
- 1547 hours** The Department of Water and Power advised Communications Division that they took down their industrial flat radio tower (#338) near Temescal and stated it may affect LAPD's radio transmission. SMOs were notified.
- 1552 hours** A unit reported two large fires at residences at 1018 & 1026 Enchanted Way, with live rounds going off in the fire.
- 1610 hours** A unit reported no visibility on westbound Sunset from PCH; the area was fully engulfed in smoke.
- 1616 hours** A palm tree caught fire at Will Rogers Park near the bathroom.
- 1618 hours** An LACoFD Captain requested a water drop at Tahitian Terrace to prevent a fire from moving into the mobile home park. However, the captain was told they were unable to do the drop due to smoke.
- 1620 hours** At 16001 PCH, mobile home park trees and homes were catching fire.
- 1635 hours** The West LA RTO advised the CP that 14 alarm calls were in the queue and how should they be handled—a West LA supervisor advised to close the calls as fire-related.
- 1643 hours** Units in Zones 13, 11, 10, and 9 were told to evacuate the area and report back to the CP. All units at Avenida de Cortez, PCH & Temescal, Sunset & PCH, Port of Marina, Malibu Home Park, and Belaire Club evacuate the area and respond to the CP.
- 1643 hours** The CP advised officers that the HOT ZONE's general area was PCH to the south, Temescal to the east, Curfew Drive to the west, and Chantia Place to the north.
- 1649 hours** The updated CP location was broadcasted as 15100 Pacific Coast Highway.
- 1700 hours** Mayor Bass held a press conference, and the Chief of Police was in attendance.
- 1713 hours** CP advised units at the CP to move all the black and white vehicles south and park west of the west curb, which is the westmost part of the parking lot.
- 1730 hours** Per a CD 11 Representative, elderly citizens at 1720 Palisades Drive were refusing to evacuate.



- 1731 hours** LAFD advised Communications Division that all evacuations go through PD.
- 1747 hours** A West LA supervisor updated the “hot zone” as the southern boundary PCH/Entrada, and the northern boundary was PCH/Topanga Canyon.
- 1756 hours** Commander 8B advised LAPD units that they were not responding into the hot zone. The CP sent Communications Division an email and pictures of the hot zone. Commander 8B requested evacuation calls be transferred to LAFD. Per LAFD, they advised they were not handling evacuations.
- 1808 hours** A West LA supervisor requested 10 units to Swarthmore Avenue and Sunset for a large crowd that had not evacuated.
- 1816 hours** A second supervisor requested an additional 10 units to Swarthmore Avenue and Sunset, for a total of 20 units.
- 1835 hours** A West LA unit requested additional units to respond to Sunset and Chautauqua for traffic control.
- 1844 hours** A West LA unit advised units in the area of Sunset and Swarthmore that there was almost zero visibility, the fire was going south to Chautauqua, and multiple homes were on fire.
- 1850 hours** Per an LAFD Captain, evacuation orders have been expanded to all of Palisades to the Santa Monica border and Mandeville Canyon to the top of the Canyon.
- 1856 hours** A unit advised that downed trees were blocking roads. The best exit route was eastbound on Sunset, down Chautauqua to PCH.
- 1857 hours** Per the Commander at DEO, an email was sent to Level C and Area Watch Commanders advising that the DOC would activate to Level II until further notice due to Palisades Fire. All Area Watch Commanders were directed to report any related issues to the DOC via email.
- 1858 hours** A West LA supervisor advised units evacuating people from the hill that eastbound Sunset was blocked by fire. Units responding should go northbound on Chautauqua. Evacuate the area to the east side of Chautauqua (to the right), head towards Chautauqua, not Sunset.
- 1901 hours** The first looting incident was reported (Inc 3702).
- 1908 hours** Watch-3 units responding to the CP were advised to check in with the IC for their mission.



- 1909 hours** A unit at Sunset and Amalfi was directing evacuees eastbound on Sunset.
- 1915 hours** A supervisor requested that all units at Sunset and Chautauqua meet her at Chautauqua and Almoloya for accountability and to ensure a secure exit.
- 1920 hours** An email was sent to all sworn personnel advising that any OWB and OCB personnel not assigned to Palisades Fire could go EOW.
- 1950 hours** LAFD notified an EOC Captain of the request for transportation vans. Units from Palisades staging went to the POTUS CP at ARTC, obtained 3 vans, and took them to Palisades CP at 15100 PCH.
- 2000 hours** The DOC was advised by EOC liaison that winds and fires may increase.
- 2027 hours** A unit requested three additional units to Temescal and Sunset for escorts and requested units to respond with googles.
- 2035 hours** Commander 8B requested 100 goggles for the CP. The Emergency Services Division Commanding Officer advised that MIRT already had goggles at the CP.
- 2200 hours** The DOC received a message from the IC that winds had increased significantly in the Palisades, above 70 MPH. LAFD was in life-saving mode; structures were a secondary concern. LAFD estimated that 200 homes had been burned.
- 2243 hours** A fire was reported near the Palisades Fire CP at 15100 PCH on the westside, towards the water.
- 2256 hours** An additional fire originally called the Sylmar Fire was renamed as the Hurst Fire.
- 2300 hours** The DEO advised the OO Director of the Hurst Fire and the OVB TAC Alert.
- 2330 hours** At 0600 hours, IMT-1 was scheduled to take over Hurst Fire CP, and IMT-2 was scheduled to take over the Palisades Fire at 0600 hours.



Wednesday, January 8, 2025

OWB IMT

- 0005 hours** The OWB Palisades IC transferred command to Olympic Area Commanding Officer, Commander 20A. He advised that he had adequate resources for the night and would reevaluate in the morning. There were 100-mile-per-hour winds, and PPE had been provided.
- 0046 hours** The CP advised that the new phone number was updated.
- 0110 hours** Per LAFD.ORG, an Evacuation Center was established at Westwood Recreation Center 1350 S. Sepulveda. A large animal evacuation center was established at 480 Riverside Drive in Burbank.
- 0230 hours** The LAFD liaison verified with CP if they had been receiving evacuation requests via text messages. The CP advised LAFD that they had not been receiving any requests and that they must have been communicating with someone's personal number that is no longer on the incident. LAFD provided the LAPD CP with a list of requests. The CP immediately handled the requests from LAFD.
- 0319 hours** Communications Division called the CP to verify if they were receiving evacuation requests via text message. The CP was unaware that notifications were being made via text message to the cellphone provided by VCDC PM watch Sr PSR. Communications Division was directed to landline the CP with all evacuation requests.
- 0330 hours** Hurst IC advised DEO at 0400 CP and that staging would be moved to Fire Station 87 (10124 Balboa Blvd.).
- 0500 hours** Commander 20A began communicating with the IMT-2 Commander, who was at Zuma Beach.

Citywide IMT-2

- 0600 hours** Citywide IMT-2 was briefed on the incident and assumed command.
- 0630 hours** The new CP contact number Palisades Fire was updated.
- 0745 hours** The IC made a request to ITB for cell phone boosters.



- 0838 hours** An LAFD Dispatch Captain requested that calls for downed power lines be transferred to LAFD for an interview to ascertain if the caller is additionally reporting a fire related to the downed power line before referring the caller to DWP.
- 1035 hours** Several incidents were created for evacuated homes being burglarized.
- 1043 hours** Palisades Fire Evacuation Detail: 1 Sergeant, 10 Officers; Crime Suppression: 1 Lieutenant, 8 Sergeants, 25 Officers; Traffic Control: 8 Sergeants, 32 Officers.
- 1048 hours** An LAPD unit advised that Cal Fire was requesting hard closure at Sunset and Mandeville. They are unable to get through with equipment to fight the fire.
- 1104 hours** An LAPD unit requested a hard closure at Riviera Road and Sunset at the opening of Old Ranch Road for fire department vehicles; they are unable to get fire trucks into the area.
- 1122 hours** An LAPD unit requested to close Old Ranch Road.
- 1126 hours** A shelter location for City employees was established at 609 S Barrington Avenue.
- 1130 hours** Per Major Events Group Commanding Officer, regarding POTUS at 1800 hours, 00/10/100 staged at ARTC for Fire Department.
- 1145 hours** The LAPD Palisades Fire IC requested 1/10/100 from POTUS when they demobilize.
- 1435 hours** The PPE request was fulfilled, and an email was sent.
- 1500 hours** Traffic Control Locations:
Sunset Blvd/Kenter Ave – DOT “advanced” hard closure No w/b Sunset Blvd;
Sunset Blvd/Mandeville Cyn – Q30/Q33, No w/b Sunset;
Sunset Blvd/Allenford – Q80, DOT x2, hard closure in all directions;
Sunset Blvd/Chautauqua -Q50, DOT x2, hard closure in all directions;
Sunset Blvd/Via de La Paz -Q43/Q44, hard closure @ Sunset Blvd;
Sunset Blvd/PCH -Q31/Q32/Q35, DOT x2, hard closure in all directions;
PCH/Porto Marina -Q41, DOT x2, down power lines, hard closure in all directions;
PCH/Temescal Cyn -Q33, DOT x2, hard closure in all directions;
PCH/Channel Rd -Q30, DOT x2, hard closure in all directions;
PCH/Entrada Dr -Q120, No n/b PCH or e/b Entrada.



- 1724 hours** The Master Evacuation incident changed to Incident No. 2838.
- 1925 hours** Per the Deputy Chief at the DOC, the Citywide Tactical Alert remained in effect. All units logged on or assigned to the Palisades, Hurst, and Sunset Fires are to remain on duty until DOC notifies them.
- 2020 hours** The COP advised the Deputy Chief at the DOC that Port PD and LAX PD personnel may be available for assignments tomorrow.
- 2200 hours** The DOC was notified that the Mayor's Office asked Parks & Recs to open four locations for an "Augmented Winter Shelter program" for the duration of the fires. Parks & Recs agreed to open only with 24/7 LAPD staffing. Locations are TBD in Council Districts 1, 3, 4, and 13. The request will be fulfilled with an unknown start date.
- 2320 hours** At Las Casas and Sunset, power lines were down, blocking the street.
- 2335 hours** At Baylor Street south of Sunset, power lines were down.
- Due to the fire, several calls were generated, and many units reported down power lines throughout the Palisades.
- 2352 hours** An LAPD unit responded to 16690 Charmel Road where a resident sheltering in place because the neighbor's home was on fire. The resident refused to evacuate.

Thursday, January 9, 2025 Citywide IMT-2

- 0020 hours** Cal Fire was asked to respond to two fire incidents at El Oro and Jalow, and a structure fire at 16690 Charmel Lane.
- 0030 hours** A downed power line was blocking Marquez Road near Sunset
- 0155 hours** An alarm call was upgraded to Robbery at Pacific Palisades Library, Incident No. 50. Per a West LA unit, the location was in the hotzone and not safe to enter, so the units were advised not to respond.
- 0205 hours** Port PD advised sending one lieutenant, three sergeants, 20 officers, two motor officers, and three K9 officers to the Palisades Fire CP.
- 0317 hours** There was a fire at 17319 Sunset Blvd #3730, at the Westside Waldorf School. The fire was reported to Cal Fire.



- 0324 hours** LASD advised that Santa Monica had a curfew in place.
- 0339 hours** Per the DOC, the Citywide Tactical Alert remained in effect. Watch-5 and Watch-7 units not assigned to the Palisades or Hurst were allowed to go EOW at regularly scheduled times.
- 0400 hours** LAX PD advised that they will send one lieutenant, one sergeant, and 14 officers to Palisades CP.
- 0550 hours** The CP received maps for evac, burn, and OPS from Cal Fire logistics.
- 0630 hours** An LAPD unit requested the CP assist the Red Cross Shelter.
- 0640 hours** The Citywide Tac Alert remained in effect. All units logged on or assigned to the Palisades, Hurst and Sunset Fires were told to remain on duty until notified by the DOC.
- 0707 hours** Four units from Hollenbeck Area responded code-three to the Palisades CP.
- 0715 hours** Commander 11B met with an LAFD Arson Investigators regarding a Death Investigation, RD 0823.
- 0810 hours** The Fire Department requested units for traffic control for citizens attempting to enter the restricted fire zone to reach their residences.
- 0815 hours** The DOC discussed looting; one unit was assigned to Pan Pacific Shelter and submitted an ICS 214.
- 0858 hours** Looting Incident No. 0968 was created.
- 1015 hours** An LAPD unit reported a structure fire at 283 Trino Way and notified Cal Fire. They were advised that there was no water in the fire hydrant.
- 1020 hours** An LAPD unit requested two units for traffic control to block traffic on Sunset for the active fire. Residents were attempting to enter the area.
- 1023 hours** An LAPD unit advised that residents were returning to the area on Sunset to the north between RD 0822 and 0823. There was an active fire with no traffic control. Two units were requested for traffic control at the location.
- 1026 hours** An LAPD unit requested units to block traffic because residents were actively trying to enter the hotzone.



- 1035 hours** A radio call was generated for a police escort to 443 W. Rustic Road to retrieve medication.
- 1043 hours** Communications Division attempted to contact the CP and received a message stating that the voicemail box was not set up. They were unable to leave a message. The DOC was notified and attempted to get a better callback number.
- 1046 hours** The IC advised the DOC regarding the information for Public and Media phone lines. Refer all donation requests to American Red Cross at www.redcross.org/palisadesfire
- 1058 hours** The IC was advised that any death investigation, including RMS case number, needed to be forwarded to RHD for tracking purposes.
- 1102 hours** The new CP number was designated.
- 1110 hours** LAPD's Staging are advised that if citizens arrived at the checkpoint asking to get into their homes for medication, they were allowed with an ID and a police escort. If no officers were available, they were to call Staging.
- 1124 hours** Communications Division advised callers who needed an escort for medication only to present an ID and provide a location to meet with PD. An EBO would call Staging with the information, and they would send a unit to meet the resident.
- 1125 hours** Per the Law Branch Director, Cal Fire denied access to residents who want to retrieve their vehicles from evacuated zones for the next 72 hours.
- 1151 hours** A fire was reported at Sunset and Muskingum in RD 0811. The CP requested two additional units for traffic control.
- 1208 hours** A Verizon employee with a portable tower arrived at the CP.
- 1236 hours** A radio call was broadcast for a welfare check at 20414 Roca Chica Drive for a 94 year-old female. The daughter called and advised she refused to evacuate.
- 1242 hours** LAX-1 reported that DWP has a large crowd jumping a fence at the entrance of Kenter Trail.
- 1249 hours** A citizen requested an escort to retrieve medication from their home at 14th and Wilshire, at the Pavilions parking lot in Santa Monica. Per Staging, the citizen was advised to go to the barricade and call back for the PD to meet.



- 1249 hours** An LAPD supervisor requested additional units for traffic control at 1184 Kenter Trail at the trailhead because a large group of 20-30 people were attempting to gather and walk up to take pictures.
- 1257 hours** Communications Division called the CP regarding medication retrieval at 1517 Monaco Road in RD 803. They attempted to call Staging, but there was no answer. They were called back and advised that, per Cal Fire, there were no more escorts.
- 1300 hours** An LAX unit requested two units to assist with crowd control at Sunset and PCH; approximately 20-30 persons were trying to get back into their residences. The crowd was calm and media was at the location.
- 1331 hours** Per the Law Branch Director, residents were only allowed back into evacuated zones for medicine with a police escort.
- 1351 hours** The DOC received 211/214 from OVB 0/2/11 for January 9 at 1800 hours (Palisades Fire MOF).
- 1412 hours** LAFD requested hard closures at Sunset and PCH, and Sunset and Muskingum.
- 1427 hours** An LAPD unit advised he was in RD 0824 with a crew attempting to spray houses with water and fire retardant. The IC requested the unit to escort them out of evacuation area.
- 1429 hours** An LAPD supervisor reported that over 40 people and two construction crews were on Channel and PCH because LADOT was letting traffic through.
- 1436 hours** The CP was notified that a drone was being operated at 283 Trino Way in RD 0823, making Cal Fire unable to conduct water drop flights. Cal Fire requested that LAPD find the drone operator and shut it down.
- 1438 hours** DOC received an urgent 215 request from ESD 0/0/60 for January 9 at 0700 hours, for the Palisades Fire.
- 1440 hours** Communications Division contacted the CP to find out if the media was allowed into the evacuation zone at Ellsworth and Sunset. Per the CP, if it's in the evacuation zone, then no.
- 1444 hours** Directions were given to residents needing escorts for medication to give them information and call Staging.
- 1444 hours** Communications Division's direction for calls requesting evacuation: Create a call, and the BCC will contact the CP and provide the information.



- 1523 hours** Per LAFD mandatory evacuation order for Woodland Hills brushfire Incident No. 2325 – Kenneth Fire.
- 1527 hours** The CP was notified that all media was allowed into the evacuation area. The message was passed to all personnel assigned to the Palisades Fire.
- 1957 hours** The CP received second-hand information per FD 114 stating that LAFD was not responding to wires down, flooding, trash fires, vehicle fires, elevator entrapments, and fire alarms. They were only responding to structure fires and most medical calls.
- 2200 hours** DOC bureau liaisons contacted Port PD and LAWA Watch Commanders to get available personnel for Friday, Saturday, and Sunday A and B Watch. Port PD provided 1/3/25 for A Watch Fri-Sun and 1/2/10 for B Watch Fri-Sun.

Friday, January 10, 2025

Citywide IMT-2

- 0010 hours** Palisades Fire IC requested two black and white units to respond to 15100 PCH for security detail.
- 0315 hours** The CP contacted Cal Fire regarding propane tanks found at Sunset and Amalfi. Public Works stated they would not respond.
- 0350 hours** A National Guard Captain checked into the CP and advised that 100 National Guardsmen would arrive, and 50 would be able to deploy between watch A and B.
- 0629 hours** Missing Persons Unit (MPU) had three people reported missing between 1800-0600 hours. The CP was advised to report missing people due to the fire to MPU.

Citywide IMT-1

- 0600 hours** Citywide IMT-1 was briefed on the status of the incident and assumed command.
- 0629 hours** The Missing Persons Unit (MPU) had three people reported missing between 1800-0600 hours. The CP was advised to report missing people due to the fire to MPU.



2025 Palisades Fire

After-Action Report

- 0819 hours** An LAPD sergeant at Zuma CP requested evacuation maps. Information was passed to DOC liaisons.
- 0923 hours** MCD requested all tips from Crime Stoppers regarding drones and drone footage in fire affected areas.
- 0944 hours** An LAPD unit reported a fire on the hillside railroad ties at 16810 Glynn Drive in RD 0811.
- 1004 hours** A unit requested escort units to Sunset and Allenford for a mile-long carload of people requesting to retrieve medication.
- 1004 hours** A unit reported a drone being operated. The unit was advised by CP that no drones were to be operated.
- 1010 hours** The Palisades CP sent an SCE employee to Zuma Beach CP regarding 5000 to 7000 meter checks with outside crews.
- 1050 hours** The CP requested an Air Unit check standing structures in the area and provide a location for crime control units (Mandeville Canyon to Mulholland to the water and sea border to the north). Per Air 16, LAFD is doing water drops, and PD is unable to go into that area.
- 1120 hours** Stoner Recreation Center at 1835 Stoner Ave., LA 90025 was activated as a shelter.
- 1206 hours** Per the DOC, the Rivera Country Club at 1250 Capri Drive 90270 was available for a CP if needed.
- 1210 hours** The DOC was notified that a 92 year-old female had been found deceased.
- 1735 hours** The CP advised all units of the 1800 hours curfew.
- 1747 hours** Per the UCP, the LAPD would not be doing medication escorts past the 1800 hours curfew.
- 1754 hours** Down power lines were reported at PCH north of Tahiti. DWP was notified and dispatched.
- 1920 hours** The CP assigned Metropolitan Division B Platoon to handle evacuations from Mandeville to Sunset / Encino Reservoir to the 405 Freeway.
- 1940 hours** The LAPD OSC requested 4 supervisors and 40 officers from the Palisades CP to meet a Valley Captain.



- 2002 hours** 6 supervisors and 60 officers were redirected to Portola Middle School by the DOC. Palisades Staging personnel responded to assist with check-in resources.
- 2008 hours** Communications Division advised that at 1955 hours, Tustin PD notified the DOC that three Humvees and 10 uniforms were stolen; information was broadcasted every hour.
- 2018 hours** The CP notified all units in evacuation zones to use PA to advise the public of the evacuation notice.
- 2031 hours** The CP advised all A-Watch units assigned to the fire that they were being held over.
- 2037 hours** A fire was reported at Ridgeline and PCH across from National Guard Humvees.
- 2116 hours** The CP advised that homes in RD 0804 west of the 405 Freeway were mandatory evacuations, but homes in RD 0805 east of the 405 Freeway were only warned.

Saturday, January 11, 2025 Citywide IMT-1

- 0028 hours** Per Cal Fire, evacuated areas must remain evacuated, White Oak Avenue to the 405 Freeway, Venice to Sunset.
- 0037 hours** Wind direction was to the northeast but is now blowing southwest towards the burn site.
- 0041 hours** The CP advised that they were still waiting for National Guard Command to approve their personnel to assist with fixed posts on Brentwood and Encino, .
- 0123 hours** The CP directed Communications to create and broadcast burglary, prowler, and alarm calls in RDs 0801, 0802, 0803, 0804, 0811, 0812, 0813, 0823, 0824, and 0843 on West LA base and Citywide Tac 2 Channel 40. Crime suppression units were to handle these radio calls.
- 0602 hours** The CP notified LAPD supervisors to escort residents to their property for medication retrieval beginning at 0800 hours.



- 0609 hours** All units on the TAC Channel were notified by the CP to escort residents to retrieve their medication only. Officers have to escort residents in and out of the perimeters.
- 0709 hours** A large group of residents was waiting for RX escorts at PCH and West Channel.
- 0710 hours** Per the LAPD Military Liaison, four National Guard units will be assigned at Sunset and Cliffwood fixed posts, and four to high visibility on Sunset.
- 1120 hours** Two LAPD units were holding a crime scene.
- 1125 hours** The UCP requested units at Barberry Lane and Green Briar to assist Cal Fire with pedestrian traffic.
- 1141 hours** The National Guard deployed four vehicles, 16 personnel at Temescal Canyon and PCH, and at Sunset and PCH, for hide.
- 1321 hours** The 6Q240,6Q250, 6Q320/21Q320/21Q350/21Q60/21Q360/21Q370 series were deployed to the valley fire.
- 1339 hours** The CP broadcasted and messaged all units regarding media being allowed into all evacuation areas.
- 1654 hours** The CP requested 100 additional California National Guard soldiers through the DOC.
- 1703 hours** LAWA units handled escorts at PCH Channel.
- 1710 hours** The Zuma UCP requested LAPD crime suppression units to respond to LAFD having problems with media impeding fire operations, Incident No. 2694.
- 1715 hours** The CP requested the 6Q160 units conduct crime suppression at PCH and Sunset to 10 Freeway.
- 1725 hours** The UCP advised that all escorts would stop at 1800 hours. Private security and private fire were ok to enter with proper credentials.
- 1843 hours** At 3099 Mandeville Canyon, RD 0803, an unknown number of people were impeding firefighters from fighting the fire.
- 2355 hours** There was a report of gas smell coming from a burned building at 16556 W. Sunset, in RD 0822.



Sunday, January 12, 2025

Citywide IMT-1

- 0027 hours** The National Guard reported a fire on the northeast side of PCH and Temescal Canyon.
- 0438 hours** The UCP advised that no escorts were allowed into the evacuation zone until further notice.
- 0506 hours** The LAPD CP was advised that private security could be credentialed at the Zuma UCP located at 3000 Pacific Coast Highway.
- 0631 hours** The BCC broadcasted to all units that there would be no escorts until further notice. Hourly broadcasts were made, and a message was sent to all MDCs.
- 0820 hours** The UCP received secondhand information regarding pedestrians walking to the rear of Sullivan Canyon Park. The Off-Road Team responded.
- 0914 hours** Air 3 reported a small brushfire to the rear of 16805 Monte Hermoso Drive in RD 0801.
- 1903 hours** Per the UCP, three suspects were possibly impersonating firefighters in a newer model Jeep Wrangler. A radio call was created.
- 2125 hours** Most A-Watch personnel had been relieved with the exception of a few traffic units. Many units were deployed to RDs 0812 and 0813.
- The District Attorney wanted to be called before any arrest bookings.
- Logistics notified the IMT that a chain link fence was to be put up around the CP.
- 2154 hours** All crime suppression and metro units "hide" headlights only. No sirens per COP.

Monday, January 13, 2025

Citywide IMT-1

- 0001 hours** The CP requested bicycle racks if they were unable to get a chain link fence for the CP.
- 0530 hours** The CP reported that the 100 additional National Guard soldiers that were requested had arrived.



The CP requested that Media Relations send a PIO to the CP to talk to the media.

Advise personnel to have private security respond to Zuma Beach for passes.

No escorts were allowed into evacuation zones, including for medications.

Citywide IMT-2

- 0600 hours** Citywide IMT-2 was briefed on the status of the incident and assumed command.
- 1045 hours** An LAPD unit responded to 16637 Calle Haleigh, in RD 0811, to escort the Consulate General.
- 1050 hours** The LAPD began allowing Department of Animal Regulations personnel into evacuation zones but no community volunteers.
- 1359 hours** The CP was advised that SMPD was allowing residents into the evacuation zone at Ocean and Mabery, near RD 0824.
- 1505 hours** An evacuation order was issued for parts of Brentwood that were not notified on January 10. Officers knocked on the doors of several neighborhoods. Some homes did not answer, others reported they would evacuate, and several advised they were not leaving and would shelter in place.

Tuesday, January 14, 2025

Citywide IMT-2

- 0411 hours** A gas worker reported a spot fire on the hill at 17250 W. Sunset; FD was notified.
- 0623 hours** America Reclamation arrived at Mandeville and Sunset to pick up a trash container and drop off a new one at Will Rogers State Park without a permit. They were directed to Zuma Beach for a permit.
- 0630 hours** Private Security was advised to report to Zuma Beach for a permit.
- 0710 hours** Parks and Recs requested the location for credentials, and they were advised Zuma Beach.
- 0920 hours** An FBI cadaver dog team arrived for a search.



- 1000 hours** An email was sent to Communications Division to create all non-emergency calls in RDs 0801, 0802, 0803, 0804, 0811, 0812, 0813, 0823, and 0824.
- 1115 hours** Media Relations provided a soundbite to Telemundo and CBS.
- 1322 hours** The CP advised that it was holding hard closures in RD 0801-0804, 0811-0813, and 0823-0824. No one is to enter the area. Citizens who left the area would not be allowed back for any reason. For welfare checks on animals, citizens could be provided a contact number.
- 1400 hours** An LAPD unit advised that SMPD was letting pedestrians through at Ocean and San Vicente and requested to know if the area was open. Per the CP, the LAPD side is still closed.
- 1418 hours** An LAPD unit was requested to meet with USAR / Search and Rescue regarding a gun found in a safe. Due to fire damage, the safe was unable to be secured, and the unit was advised to contact the CP before handling the gun.
- 1525 hours** The media was set up within the CP and was to broadcast for 30 minutes. Approved by LAFD PIO.

Wednesday, January 15, 2025 Citywide IMT-2

- 0239 hours** Southern California Edison reported being unable to enter the evacuation area due to LASD not allowing entry. They were attempting to continue restoring power and needed 24-hour security to have access. Zuma CP notified and gave information for SoCal Edison.
- 1330 hours** LAPD participated in a meeting with CHP, CalTrans, and DOT to discuss the options of opening the 10 Freeway and PCH.
- 1833 hours** Per Quicksilver Tow, LAPD allowed them into affected West LA areas to tow vehicles as long as they were not completely burned.
- 2044 hours** A unit reported National Guard radio batteries were dying.

Thursday, January 16, 2025 Citywide IMT-2

- 0044 hours** Calls involving DWP, if DWP requested extra patrol, were to be referred to the Area Watch Commander. If an EBO determined there was a credible threat, a



call needed to be generated. Proceed per policy if DWP requested standby or escort to location.

Citywide IMT-1

- 0600 hours** Citywide IMT-1 was briefed on the status of the incident and assumed command.
- 0624 hours** The UCP advised that there would be no escorts today.
- 0752 hours** An info-only broadcast was made on OWB Tac 2 Channel 40 and CW Tac 2 Channel 44. Per Cal Fire, no LAUSD or USPS workers were allowed in the fire zone; only utility workers were allowed.
- 0800 hours** An LAPD unit at Chautauqua and PCH had six vehicles from the Bureau of Land Management requesting entry into the evacuation zone. The unit was advised the Bureau of Land Management was allowed entry to the zone.
- 0815 hours** Per Cal Fire, only utility workers and vehicles were allowed inside the evacuation areas; no LAUSD or USPS workers or vehicles were allowed. Utility workers did not need a pass for entry.
- 1030 hours** A Councilwoman reported a burglary at her residence.
- 1035 hours** Updated traffic closure: Traffic was open at northbound on Kenter from Sunset, northbound on Sepulveda, and Getty Center. Residents were allowed into the evacuation zone.
- 1100 hours** A large number of bicyclists and pedestrians were entering the area northbound on PCH from the California Incline. PCH was handled by Santa Monica.
- 1127 hours** An LAPD supervisor advised that approximately three residents were burglarized in the 300 block of Oceano. A West LA W-2 Unit and West LA Detectives handled the report and will coordinate with Commercial Crimes.
- 1210 hours** On Sunset east of Palisades Drive, units worked with Quicksilver Tow to remove approximately 35 vehicles, some totally burned from the roadway. Some vehicles that were burned or severely damaged would be impounded, but those with only moderate damage are being removed to a nearby lot to be retrieved by their owners. CHP 180 forms were completed for all vehicles moved or impounded, and copies were provided to the CP.



- 1322 hours** Per the CP, private fire companies are only allowed into restricted areas if extinguishing active fires.
- 1350 hours** An information-only broadcast was made on OWB Tac 2 Channel 40 and CW Tac 2 Channel 44 that no escorts would be allowed into the restricted areas.
- 1434 hours** The CP reported five mountain bikers biking on the unpaved area of Mulholland and Fire Road 30, and requested the Off-Road Unit to handle.
- 1542 hours** Fire 34 requested LAPD to meet for found property of high value items.
- 2050 hours** A unit was sent to Westwood Recreation Center to provide additional security to Red Cross employees for a threat.
- 2323 hours** A roll call of units was conducted to confirm that all officers had reception.

Friday, January 17, 2025 Citywide IMT-1

- 0001 hours** During a debrief, no major incidents were reported.
- 0752 hours** Per the CP, all Public Utility worker subcontractors (Gas and DWP) were allowed into the evacuation area but private companies were not.
- 0845 hours** An LAPD supervisor reported that shop radios were not working but handheld radios were working.
- 0951 hours** The UCP advised all units that there would be no more escorts until further notice.
- 1151 hours** The UCP advised that Genasys Zones 767C and 767B would be allowed to repopulate at 1200 hours.
- 1200 hours** Additional checkpoints were opened. Residents living east of Amalfi would be allowed to enter with proper ID.
- 1507 hours** The CP clarified that curfew was still in effect for everyone in closed areas. The curfew was lifted for residents only, and there is still a curfew for non-residents.
- 1607 hours** Units were directed to conduct high visibility patrol for burglaries.



2020 hours CHP provided 2 supervisors and 26 special response officers, and 22 officers to be assigned to fixed posts. The EOC was notified.

Saturday, January 18, 2025

IMT-1

0822 hours The LAPD CP exchanged with the DOC.

0822 hours The LAPD CP advised that there have been 15 arrests since the start of the incident.

1000 hours IMT-1 held a command and general staff briefing.

1000 hours Repopulation began in 767-B & 767-C with proper identification. All other areas remained hard closures for the general public, with the exception of utility workers and first responders.

1215 hours An LAPD supervisor inquired with the CP about a green tag found outside a residence. Per the CP, Cal Fire is responsible for leaving tags. The supervisor will attempt to obtain the colors and what they mean.

1252 hours ECCCS requested an officer to respond to the area of 15214 Whitfield to conduct a radio check, AT&T phone call, and site survey for reported radio issues.

1330 hours The CP requested a CW Tac Channel due to the National Guard using the frequency. Communications Division assigned CW Tac 2 Channel 44.

1425 hours An officer at the EOC called inquiring about curfew times. Curfew 0600-1800 in both evacuation order and evacuation warning zones. The officer was also referred to the Los Angeles County website and watch duty website for further.

1500 hours A structural engineer on the 15300 block of Via De Las Olas requested K Rails for a freeway or structure being compromised. CalTrans handle per DOT.

1817 hours CP monitoring CW TAC 2 CH 44 for the National Guard. No reception for the National Guard units at TCP 37, TCP 38, and TCP 39 on OWB TAC 2 CH 40, in the hills.



Sunday, January 19, 2025 Citywide IMT-4

- 0600 hours** Citywide IMT-4 was briefed on the incident and assumed command.
- 0640 hours** An LAPD unit reported smelling gas at Pampas Ricas Blvd. and Chautauqua. The Gas Company was notified.
- 1008 hours** Palisades Communications reported having phone problems.
- 1021 hours** LAFD advised that there was an eight-foot sinkhole near PCH and Temescal Canyon.
- 1035 hours** The CP was notified of a second sinkhole at Temescal Canyon between Sunset and PCH. Notified Palisades Communications. Unknown size at the time.
- 1257 hours** Southern Cal Gas Company needed a vehicle towed or moved for a gas leak under the burnt vehicle.
- 1318 hours** The UCP advised that the Army Core of Engineers was allowed into the area.
- 1333 hours** Beginning of repopulation of the Highlands Area (767-J).
- 1335 hours** CHP advised that they had a package of 10 civilian vehicles escorted by CHP and needed PCH and Estrada opened for them to enter.
- 1514 hours** At the UCP, the Fire Liaison for utilities directed that any subcontractors for utilities were allowed entry with valid credentials. For any contractors, email "Luis Lara." For email approval, state who, vehicle make, model, and where in the fire area they can gain access. Include all contractors and a contact number above if the person was stopped.
- 1743 hours** CID advised that Quicksilver Tow could be called to tow vehicles out of the Palisades as long as they were not completely burned. Any citizen who left their vehicle due to the fires could call Quicksilver Tow directly and ask for a manager.
- 1800 hours** DOC Officer called the CP and inquired if anyone was handling the extra patrol for the DWP equipment at three different locations. CP advised B-Watch was handling.
- 2122 hours** CID reported that eight vehicles burned as of 01/16/25. 31 vehicles were relocated by Quicksilver Tow due to fire damage.



Monday, January 20, 2025

Citywide IMT-4

- 0840 hours** Lot 3 opened for residents wishing to return to their homes.
- 1045 hours** A citizen requested access to his property to check on a safe containing approximately seven weapons. The location was in a red zone and could not be accessed by the PD or citizens. The citizen was informed to stay updated regarding access to the zone via 211 and the Cal Fire map.
- 1300 hours** Due to the CityWide Tac Alert, some calls for burglary investigations within the evacuation and warning zones were not generated.
- 1632 hours** The number of arrests increased on this day, from 16 to 17. Arrest #16 was for a drone RFC, and Arrest #17 was for a possible 459.
- 1730 hours** The LAPD CP advised Communications Division that all 459 and 9212 radio calls were to be broadcasted on OWB Tac 2 Channel 40.
- 1744 hours** The UCP advised that citizens could download the GENASYS app or check the website for the most updated information.
- 1745 hours** Burglary radio calls within the evacuation zone, including areas that were open to repopulation, were assigned to Crime Suppression units.

Tuesday, January 21, 2025

Citywide IMT-4

- 0710 hours** The IMT-4 Operations Chief briefed A-Watch TCPS on crime suppression and the current situation with access for media, logistics, and National Guard Liaison.
- 0730 hours** The OSC briefed A-Watch Crime Suppression Supervisors and advised RD 0824 high crime (459) area. Extra patrol was requested at Entrada and Amalfi area. The OSC also briefed the DOT Liaison.
- 0800 hours** Operations Chief Briefed A-Watch: Repopulation Zone J and F (RD 0801), west side of 0811), 1000-1700 escort for residents, no re-entry allowed after 1700 hours; residents who entered the area were to stay in the area. Emergency only escorts out of the area were available for residents; officers were directed to utilize the GENASYS APP to check FD zoning.
- 0820 hours** The IC directed to impound every car that is safe to impound; if unsafe, it should be left in place. CID was directed to work with EPA to remove those



with lithium batteries. The Operations Chief briefed the Investigative Branch Director and impound group.

- 0905 hours** Communications Division was briefed on additional information on repopulation of F and J Zones for call takers awareness.
- 0905 hours** A broadcast was made for units assigned to the CP to log on using assigned unit designations and watch.
- 0950 hours** Crime suppression RD's updated to reflect current Zones, RD 801-804, 811-813, 823, 824, general area West LA Division west of 405 Freeway and north of Sunset and west of San Vicente Blvd.
- 1038 hours** The ATF CP requested assistance with trash removal at 17300 PCH, but no sanitation liaison at Palisades CP was found. The DOC was contacted to request a sanitation liaison at the EOC. The request for sanitation and the address of ATF CP were also relayed.
- 1203 hours** Lot 3, organized escorts. Location 1350 PCH, Santa Monica, for repopulation; no other escorts allowed.
- 1236 hours** Inquiries regarding escorts to residences: No escorts are allowed in evacuation zones. Due to a flare-up in LOS-0767-F, escorts are currently only allowed from Santa Monica Lot 3 for LOS-0767-J. See the Genasys website.
- 1300 hours** A situational awareness email was sent to Communications Division due to multiple calls and confusing advice from the National Guard at check points, causing citizens to call 911.
- 1317 hours** Escorts were open to LOS-767-F Zone; Communications Division was notified.
- 1500 hours** Media staging location requested by Communications, advised south of the Palisades CP. Briefing on repopulation issues and incidents as of 1500 hours IMT-2.
- 1600 hours** TCP 51 requested a unit for a citizen requesting an escort to their residence to retrieve a firearm. FD advised they would escort him.
- 1715 hours** IMT-4 IC and Operations Chief participated in the virtual meeting with members of City Hall.
- 1740 hours** DWP and citizens advised power was back on in repopulated areas, activating multiple 906B4, and 906B1S. The CP advised units to still respond to all calls.



Wednesday, January 22, 2025 Citywide IMT-2

- 0600 Hours** Citywide IMT02 was briefed on the status of the incident and assumed command.
- 0655 hours** A supervisor doing impounds in the hills did not have good reception and requested a PSR to run plates to identify the vehicles. Communications Division approved the request regardless of the Tac Alert.
- 0750 hours** The UCP requested to confirm that LAPD had officers assigned to escort a volunteer team. They were referred to Lot 3, and assisted with screening returning residents.
- 0850 hours** An LAPD supervisor inquired about insurance adjusters in a closed area with a permit for entry flying drones to assess the property; per CP, no drones allowed.
- 0900 hours** A unit advised of a 3rd party gas company hired by So Cal Gas to do work near a crime scene at Bienvenida and Via Floresita. A detective was dispatched to confirm if they were clear to work near the crime scene. Detectives met with workers and approved them to work.
- 0950 hours** Bank of America security called and advised that the building at 15314 W. Sunset was a total loss; however, it has fireproof vaults with multiple safety deposit boxes and requested extra patrol.
- 1000 hours** FD was escorting citizens into the repopulated area. A unit requested confirmation due to a crime scene held in the area of Via La Costa and Via Las Palmas. The CP advised that escorts to buildings are the only escorts allowed. Citizens were not allowed in the trails, trailheads, parks, hills, and backyards.
- 1154 hours** Five officers and one supervisor were released from the CP due to the fire evacuation in Castaic. The DOC was notified.
- 1410 hours** FD found a gun during a search and rescue operation on Calle Del Cielo. The gun was in an open safe. The gun was recovered and booked by a supervisor.
- 1543 hours** After a meeting with the County Sheriffs, Malibu CP requested LAPD to adjust the escort process for the Surview Neighborhood. Instead of stopping escorts at Coastline and PCH, have LAPD officers turn on Coastline and escort residents up to Surview Street so they don't drive in the area and into the blocked Sheriff's side. The CP was notified and will make the adjustments.



- 1856 hours** The Air Unit was advised that they had no clearance from Cal Fire to enter the area for 459 suspects.
- 2329 hours** The West LA Watch Commander notified the CP of the need for fire resources, and all 20Q140 unit series responded to the fire.

Thursday, January 23, 2025 Citywide IMT-2

- 0002 hours** Metropolitan units advised they had a possible arson suspect in custody.
- 0004 hours** All of the Q300 series units responded to Sepulveda and the Getty Center for mandatory evacuation.
- 0023 hours** The Jackie Robinson Stadium at UCLA is the CP, 100 Constitution Avenue.
- 0033 hours** A Metro supervisor reported it was no longer a mandatory evacuation, just an evacuation warning.
- 0153 hours** Metro reported that the fire chief released the evacuation warning; however, he requested the Q140 series units to remain.
- 0609 hours** A broadcast was made that all orange passes issued at Zuma Beach by Cal Fire were still valid past the expiration date.
- 0623 hours** Repopulation was still only for F and J Zones, escort from Lot 3.
- 1156 hours** National Guard liaison broadcasted over the frequency that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was allowed to enter with a valid ID. Information was provided to all TCPs.
- 1202 hours** A quick power outage temporarily disabled radio communications and the computers at the CP. The internet connection was eventually restored.
- 1415 hours** The State of California's Law Enforcement Branch for Consumer Protection Investigators requested the process for entry. The request was given to a sergeant at the CP.
- 1532 hours** The CP was notified that 30 vehicles were towed today by Quicksilver Tow.
- 1540 hours** Ongoing issues with TCPs reporting vehicles driving through without stopping. No arrests had been made.



- 1722 hours** The SMO/ITD checked and confirmed that the power outage had been reset and that power had been restored. The SMO will be at the CP until 2200 hours.
- 2150 hours** FD advised that the K Rails would not be delivered until 01/24 at approximately 0830 hours.

Friday, January 24, 2025 Citywide IMT-2

- 0833 hours** POTUS visit update: 2 TACS, OWB TAC 1 / CH 39 and CW TAC 2 / CH 44 patched. Communications Division RTO will monitor and broadcast any significant incidents on the Palisades Fire TAC.
- 1202 hours** Hard closure at Chautauqua and Sunset.
- 1236 hours** Soft closures at PCH and Entrada Dr., PCH and Channel Rd. No entry or exit at this time.
- 1510 hours** Palisades CP and TCP units were advised that the Secret Services was finished vetting the media and additional media will need to be turned around.
- 1518 hours** Palisades CP and TCP units were advised of hard closures at Sunset and Amalfi to Sunset and Chautauqua. No one else to come on the list or not.
- 1555 hours** The Palisades CP advised that resident escorts were canceled for the rest of the day due to the POTUS visit.
- 1801 hours** No hard closures, POTUS has left the area. N/B PCH can go back to normal operations.

Saturday, January 25, 2025 Citywide IMT-1

- 0600 hours** Citywide IMT-1 was briefed on the status of the incident and assumed command.
- 0740 hours** Escorts into repopulation zones were scheduled to start at 1000 hours.
- 0800 hours** No PD was assigned to the FEMA Resources Center at this time.
- 0849 hours** Palisades Escorts Hours 1000-1700 hours.



2025 Palisades Fire

After-Action Report

- 0945 hours** Insurance adjusters were allowed to enter the allowed area (Highlands) with the resident in the same vehicle and with an escort from Lot 3 only. All other areas were still in the red zone.
- 1046 hours** The 6Q170 series responded code-three to Lot 3 to assist with repopulation.
- 1125 hours** Approximately 150 vehicles at Chautauqua and Sunset were waiting to be escorted.
- 1242 hours** A unit requested additional units for 10 vehicles at checkpoint RD 0801.
- 1311 hours** Units at checkpoints were advised that if residents left the location after the initial escort, they must report back to Lot 3 to check in again. They were not allowed to go in and out, regardless of the tape on their vehicles. If units at checkpoints had any issues, they could contact the CP.
- 1545 hours** All residents requesting an escort must check in and report to Lot 3, at 1350 PCH, Santa Monica, between 1000-1700 hours. Based on their address and evacuation zone, PD will determine if they can access their location with an escort.
- 1605 hours** Hard closure at PCH and Coastline Drive. No southbound traffic on PCH.
- 1641 hours** Units dropped off notices of potential evacuations due to mudflow at 56 locations. See Incident No. 2688 for further information.
- 1715 hours** Confirmed with the DOC that the total number of arrests was 23.

Sunday, January 26, 2025

Citywide IMT-1

- 0842 hours** An officer from the Zuma CP advised per Cal Fire that the EPA contractors should be allowed to enter checkpoints. A broadcast was made over the radio.
- 0849 hours** Units dropped off additional notices to residences in the area of potential evacuation due to mud flow in RD's 0801 & 0811. 28 additional locations.
- 1116 hours** A unit reported that multiple citizens were trespassing at PCH and Coastline Dr, in RD 0811. They possibly entered through unknown streets. The CP IC requested a unit respond and escort them to Lot 3.
- 1120 hours** All residential escorts were halted until 1300 hours due to weather.



1324 hours All traffic on Palisades and Sunset was stopped until further notice due to mudslides.

Monday, January 27, 2025

Citywide IMT-1

0530 hours The UCP advised that security could enter with proper credentials; they did not require access placards issued by Zuma.

1000 hours Resident escorts were to begin at 1000 hours. Residents were directed to pick up access placards at 1150 PCH, at Santa Monica Beach Lot 3.

Tuesday, January 28, 2025

Citywide IMT-4

0600 hours Citywide IMT-4 was briefed on the status of the incident and assumed command.

0916 hours Per Air Support, there were no temporary flight restrictions. Individuals flying drones are only required to follow FAA guidelines.

1748 hours An LAPD unit was involved in a NCUOF with a 415 man at PCH and Chautauqua. The DOC was notified.

2103 hours LAPD crime suppression units responded to a radio call for burglary suspects at 17520 Revello Drive but were unable to locate evidence of a crime.

Wednesday, January 29, 2025

Citywide IMT-4

0617 hours The LAPD CP updated Communications Division with current information on TCPs and entry, as well as drone rules.

0745 hours Four officers were assigned to the Westwood Recreation Center, the FEMA site.

0815 hours The Operations Chief spoke with CalTrans regarding CalTrans plans to reopen PCH one lane in each direction at 1200 hours. CalTrans would be placing cones and signage reducing the speed limit to 25MPH; preparations only at this time. PCH remained closed until the reopening decision was made.



- 0952 hours** Per the IC, after meeting with the Chief of School PD, they committed through Saturday, February 1. The DOC was notified.
- 1306 hours** Several adjusters and agents were requesting access to the burned area and/or requested permits to enter. Per the Operations Chief, insurance adjusters and agents could enter the burned area with the homeowner only.
- 1641 hours** Units were advised that residents' passes were orange and now also white photocopied paper, and both were valid as long as the name and address matched. The TCPs advised that the National Guard was confiscating the white photocopied passes and turning residents away and to go back to Lot 3. A broadcast was made to all the units to accept the white passes per the IC.
- 1642 hours** A lieutenant from School PD called the IC on behalf of the School PD Chief and advised that School PD was committed through Friday, 1/31.

Thursday, January 30, 2025 Citywide IMT-4

- 0239 hours** An error message was received on CAD, the network showed unavailable and offline. The issue was only at the CP. SMO assisted with the issue, and the CAD system was fully operational by 0250 hours.
- 0721 hours** Escorts were no longer needed. Citizens could get permits at Lot 3, 1150 PCH Santa Monica from 1000-1700 hours.
- 0856 hours** Contractors and residents were now allowed in the fire area, with no limit to the number of contractors the residents were to bring in. Contractors were not permitted to do work but only assess the damage.
- 0857 hours** The LAPD CP advised TCPs and the CNG that contractors' passes were blue, and the residents' passes were orange.
- 0920 hours** The Recovery Center was issuing residents passes on white paper. A broadcast was made for all TCPs to accept resident passes on white paper issued from the Recovery Center.
- 1120 hours** Heavy Duty Tow requested to tow a forklift S/B Temescal Cyn to PCH. Per the CP, Heavy Duty Tow could not respond in that direction due to a sinkhole in the area.



1440 hours A broadcast was made for all officers at the TCPs to wear their yellow safety vests and requested supervisors to respond to their series of units to ensure vests were being worn.

Friday, January 31, 2025 Citywide IMT-2

0328 hours At the LAPD CP, the internet routers went down.

0600 hours Citywide IMT-2 was briefed on the status of the incident and assumed command.

1047 hours The TCPs were advised not to allow any walk-ins in the repopulation areas.

1500 hours IMT-2 participated in a Pacific Palisades Residents' Webinar with Mayor Bass and Assistant Chief Choi.

1700 hours DOC held a follow-up webinar meeting with commanding officers and Assistant Chief Choi. The meeting concluded at 1712 hours.

2128 hours The A-Watch Logistics Chief advised that the CP would lose power at 0430 hours for approximately 10-15 minutes due to maintenance.

Saturday, February 1, 2025 Citywide IMT-2

Nothing Significant to Report

Sunday, February 2, 2025 Citywide IMT-2

0736 hours Hard closures were still in effect except for those with resident passes and contractor passes.

0900 hours Six Central Area officers were released from the 6Q250 series to Central Area for an immigration protest.

0915 hours Units were advised that all passes must be checked at PCH/Chautauqua, PCH/Sunset and PCH/Malibu.

1000 hours LAPD units began escorting residents from Malibu to Lot 3 where passes were being distributed.



1100 hours Seven more units were released to assist with the protest in Central Area.

Monday, February 3, 2025

Citywide IMT-1

0900 hours A unit was deployed to 1645 Corinth Ave. to meet with a Captain for a secondary pass distribution location.

1035 hours Per CHP, signage for traffic detours on the 10 freeway was starting at Sunset to re-do cone patterns in an attempt to improve traffic flow down to PCH.

1315 hours CHP A-Watch had 2 and 20 respond to the protest in DTLA.

1715 hours CHP had the rest of A-Watch, 1 and 10 respond to the protest in DTLA.

1750 hours CAL EOS dropped off hand-held radios for CHP frequency 8 tac 94.

Tuesday, February 4, 2025

Citywide IMT-1

1500 hours PCH was closed by CalTrans.

1927 hours Private security was allowed in the area so long as they could provide proof of work.

2005 hours The Department's Citywide Tactical Alert was canceled.



Appendix

Appendix A: List of LAPD Incident Commanders

Operations-West Bureau Incident Commanders

January 7, 2025**C-Watch**

Captain Alisha Jordan
Captain Richard Gabaldon
Commander Steven Lurie

B-Watch

Captain Brian O Conner

Citywide Incident Management Team Incident Commanders

January 8, 2025	A-Watch Commander Steven Embrich	B-Watch Captain James Mylonakis
January 9, 2025	A-Watch Commander Steven Embrich	B-Watch Captain James Mylonakis
January 10, 2025	A-Watch Commander Randy Goddard	B-Watch Captain Michael Lorenz
January 11, 2025	A-Watch Commander Randy Goddard	B-Watch Captain Michael Lorenz
January 12, 2025	A-Watch Commander Randy Goddard	B-Watch Captain Michael Lorenz
January 13, 2025	A-Watch Commander Steven Embrich	B-Watch Captain Gregory Morgan
January 14, 2025	A-Watch Commander Steven Embrich	B-Watch Captain Gregory Morgan
January 15, 2025	A-Watch Commander Steven Embrich	B-Watch Captain Gregory Morgan
January 16, 2025	A-Watch Commander Randy Goddard	B-Watch Captain Michael Lorenz



2025 Palisades Fire

After-Action Report

January 17, 2025	A-Watch Commander Randy Goddard	B-Watch Captain Michael Lorenz
January 18, 2025	A-Watch Commander Randy Goddard	B-Watch Captain Michael Lorenz
January 19, 2025	A-Watch Commander Ryan Whiteman	B-Watch Captain Yasir Gillani
January 20, 2025	A-Watch Commander Ryan Whiteman	B-Watch Captain Robert Peters
January 21, 2025	A-Watch Commander Ryan Whiteman	B-Watch Captain Robert Peters
January 22, 2025	A-Watch Commander Steven Embrich	B-Watch Captain Gregory Morgan
January 23, 2025	A-Watch Commander Steven Embrich	B-Watch Captain Gregory Morgan
January 24, 2025	A-Watch Commander Steven Embrich	B-Watch Captain Gregory Morgan
January 25, 2025	A-Watch Commander Randy Goddard	B-Watch Captain Michael Lorenz
January 26, 2025	A-Watch Commander Randy Goddard	B-Watch Captain Michael Lorenz
January 27, 2025	A-Watch Commander Randy Goddard	B-Watch Captain Michael Lorenz
January 28, 2025	A-Watch Commander Ryan Whiteman	B-Watch Captain Robert Peters
January 29, 2025	A-Watch Commander Ryan Whiteman	B-Watch Captain Robert Peters



2025 Palisades Fire

After-Action Report

	A-Watch	B-Watch
January 30, 2025	Commander Ryan Whiteman	Captain Robert Peters
	A-Watch	B-Watch
January 31, 2025	Commander Steven Embrich	Captain Gregory Morgan
	A-Watch	B-Watch
February 1, 2025	Commander Steven Embrich	Captain Gregory Morgan
	A-Watch	B-Watch
February 2, 2025	Commander Steven Embrich	Captain Gregory Morgan
	A-Watch	B-Watch
February 3, 2025	Commander Randy Goddard	Captain Michael Lorenz
	A-Watch	B-Watch
February 4, 2025	Commander Randy Goddard	Captain Michael Lorenz

This space was intentionally left blank

**Appendix B: Acronyms**

Acronym	Meaning
Cal Fire	California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
CCD	Commercial Crimes Division
CHP	California Highway Patrol
CID	Commission Investigation Division
CIUV	Critical Incident Utility Vehicle
CNG	California Army Reserve National Guard
COW	Cell-on-Wheels
CP	Command Post
CRD	Compact Rapid Deployable trailer
DOC	Department Operations Center (Los Angeles Police Department)
ECCCS	Emergency Command Control Communication System Division
EMD	Emergency Management Department (City of Los Angeles)
EOC	Emergency Operations Center (City of Los Angeles)
ESD	Emergency Services Division
IC	Incident Commander
ICS	Incident Command System
IMT	Incident Management Team
IMT-1	Los Angeles Police Department Citywide Incident Management Team 1
IMT-2	Los Angeles Police Department Citywide Incident Management Team 2
IMT-3	Los Angeles Police Department Citywide Incident Management Team 3
IMT-4	Los Angeles Police Department Citywide Incident Management Team 4
ITA	Information Technology Agency
LACoFD	Los Angeles County Fire Department
LADWP	Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
LAFD	Los Angeles Fire Department
LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department
LASD	Los Angeles Sheriff's Department
LMR	Land Mobile Radio
MCD	Major Crimes Division
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NWS	National Weather Service
OPG	Official Police Garage
OSC	Operations Section Chief
OWB IMT	Incident Management Team from Operations-West Bureau
PCH	Pacific Coast Highway
POTUS	President of the United States
PSC	Planning Section Chief
RHD	Robbery Homicide Division



SatCOLT	Satellite Cell on Light Truck
TCP	Traffic Control Point
UCP	Unified Command Post
XL	A one-officer patrol unit

This space was intentionally left blank



Appendix C: Los Angeles County Curfew Order

CURFEW ORDER FOLLOWING PROCLAMATION OF EXISTENCE OF A LOCAL EMERGENCY FOR THE JANUARY 2025 WINDSTORM AND CRITICAL FIRE EVENTS

WHEREAS, on January 7, 2025, the Chair of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors ("Board") proclaimed, pursuant to Chapter 2.68 of the Los Angeles County Code ("LACC") and Government Code Section 8558(c)(1), the existence of a local emergency due to conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property as a result of the January 2025 Windstorm and Critical Fire Events in the County;

WHEREAS, the Eaton Fire, the Palisades Fire, the Hurst Fire, the Creek Fire, the Lidia Fire, and the Kenneth Fire are wind-driven and destructive fires, which began on and after January 7, 2025, in the County, and have necessitated the issuance of Evacuation Orders and Evacuation Warnings;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Government Code Section 8634 and LACC section 2.68.150, during a local emergency, the Board, or, in the following priority order, the Chair of the Board, Chief Executive Officer, or the Sheriff may promulgate orders or regulations for the protection of life and property, including orders or regulations imposing a curfew within designated boundaries where necessary to preserve the public order and safety;

WHEREAS, there exists imminent danger to life and property during the hours of darkness and approaching darkness, and it is especially difficult to preserve public safety during such hours;

WHEREAS, there have already been multiple arrests for burglary and for looting and trespassing within the evacuation areas, including arrestees who do not reside in the County of Los Angeles, which indicates planned and coordinated criminal activity; and

WHEREAS, there is an imminent danger to life and property, and therefore, it is necessary to impose a curfew, as specified below, to preserve the public order and safety in the County.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. A curfew, from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. is imposed in any "Evacuation Order Zone" or any "Evacuation Warning Zone" within the City of Los Angeles, the City of Santa Monica, the City of Malibu, and all unincorporated areas of the County of Los Angeles, as such zones are identified at any of the following websites:
<https://lacounty.gov/emergency/>; protect.genasys.com; and/or www.watchduty.org. These websites show maps of each Evacuation Order Zone and each Evacuation Warning Zone. Evacuation Order Zones are highlighted on the map in red. Evacuation Warning Zones are highlighted on the map in yellow.
2. The hours of curfew are between 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. until this Order is lifted.



3. No person, except as set forth in paragraph No. 4 below, shall be upon a public street, avenue, boulevard, place, walkway, alley, park, or other public area, or any unimproved private property, within the areas described in paragraph No. 1 above, between 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
4. This Order shall not apply to peace officers; fire fighters; National Guard or other military personnel deployed to the area; emergency medical services personnel; individuals working on a project involving a public work of improvement; credentialed media representatives involved in news gathering; and individuals seeking medical treatment. For residents living within an Evacuation Warning Zone, this Order shall not apply to those residents who are traveling to or from their places of residence.
5. To extent that the terms of the County's curfew order are more stringent than any city's curfew order, the County's more stringent terms shall apply within such city to that extent.
6. Any violation of this Order is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not to exceed \$1,000 or by imprisonment for a period not to exceed six months, or both, as provided by LACC section 2.68.320 or any applicable state or municipal law.
7. This Order shall be effective immediately as of January 9, 2025, commencing at 6:00 p.m., and extending until 6:00 a.m. on the date this order is lifted. The County may renew, amend, or extend this Order in accordance with Government Code section 8634 and LACC section 2.68.150.
8. This Order shall be given widespread publicity and notice.

Dated: January 9, 2025


Chair, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors